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FICTIONAL PLEAS
THEA JOHNSON*
 A fictional plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty to a crime he has not 
committed, with the knowledge of the defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge. With 
fictional pleas, the plea of conviction is detached from the original factual 
allegations against the defendant. As criminal justice actors become increasingly 
troubled by the impact of collateral consequences on defendants, the fictional plea 
serves as an appealing response to this concern. It allows the parties to achieve 
parallel aims: the prosecutor holds the defendant accountable in the criminal system, 
while the defendant avoids devastating noncriminal consequences. In this context, 
the fictional plea is an offshoot of the “creative plea bargaining” encouraged by 
Justice Stevens in Padilla v. Kentucky. Indeed, where there is no creative option 
based on the underlying facts of an allegation, attorneys must turn to fiction.  
The first part of this Article is descriptive, exploring how and why actors in the 
criminal justice system—including defendants, prosecutors, and judges—use the 
fictional plea for the purposes of avoiding collateral consequences. This Article 
proposes that in any individual case, a fictional plea may embody a fair and just 
result—the ability of a defendant to escape severe collateral consequences and a 
prosecutor to negotiate a plea with empathy.  
But this Article is also an examination of how this seemingly empathetic practice 
is made possible by the nature of the modern adversarial process in which everything 
is a bargaining chip. What does it mean that all parties in the criminal justice system 
agree to allow a lie to become fact? What does the fictional plea tell us about the 
role of truth in our adversarial structure? Faced with the moral quandary of 
mandatory collateral consequences, the system adjusts by discarding truth and 
focuses solely on resolution. In this sense, fictional pleas serve as a case study in 
criminal justice problem solving. The fictional plea lays bare the soul of an 
institution where everything has become a bargaining chip: not merely collateral 
consequences, but truth itself. Rather than a grounding principle, truth is nothing 
more than another factor to negotiate around. 
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INTRODUCTION
A teenage defendant faces a felony charge for a single instance of unlawful sexual 
contact with a minor.1 If convicted, he would be on the sex offender registry for the 
rest of his life. The defendant is young and without a criminal record. His defense 
attorney wants to make sure that his record remains clear and that he avoids sex 
offender registration. There are many reasons the defense attorney wants to avoid 
registration, but the most important one is that being on the sex offender registry will 
exclude the defendant from shelters, group homes, and public housing. The 
defendant, already struggling to find a place to live, will be totally without options if 
he ends up with a registrable offense. Sex offender registration is the Russian doll of 
collateral consequences—consequences are nested inside of other consequences.  
The prosecutor is sympathetic to these concerns, but she wants to make sure that 
the defendant faces some real penalties within the criminal system. This is a serious 
charge with a victim involved. She also wants to make sure that the defendant is 
monitored in some way by probation. According to the prosecutor, probation can 
likely link the defendant to services and help him get on his feet.  
The prosecutor and defense attorney—both repeat players in the criminal system, 
who have worked on many cases together beyond this one—sit down to figure out a 
solution. The solution will take the form of a negotiated plea bargain—one that, 
hopefully, avoids a felony record and sex offender registration for the defendant, 
while imposing meaningful sanctions that satisfy the prosecutor’s goals. 
They begin by working backwards. What crimes can the defendant plead guilty 
to without ending up on the sex offender registry? Nearly all the sex crimes in their 
state are registrable offenses. They contemplate a plea to assault, but the prosecutor 
                                                                                                                
1. The story told in the Introduction is based on the author’s interview with a defense 
attorney. The interviewee was promised anonymity. Because of this, I will not identify the 
interviewee by name or location. 
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blanches at the “fiction” of claiming that the victim suffered “bodily injury,” which 
is one of the statutorily required elements of the offense. 
They return to the sex offenses. There is a small subset of misdemeanor sex 
offenses—under the category of unlawful sexual touching—which are formally sex 
offenses but do not carry any registration requirements. But misdemeanors are 
punishable only up to a year. To the prosecutor, this hardly seems like sufficient 
punishment for the crime, nor will it provide the necessary motivation to the 
defendant to get help for his problems.  
But what about several misdemeanor convictions, which would run consecutively? 
Under this resolution, the defendant would avoid a felony record and lifetime sex 
offender registration. The prosecutor would extract a significant sentence, involving 
monitoring by probation. The problem is that there is only one allegation of sexual 
misconduct involving the defendant and the victim. Separate misdemeanor pleas 
would involve an admission of guilt to separate factual allegations. This, however, is 
a “fiction” that both parties can tolerate. 
They agree that the defendant will plead to three misdemeanors. Because these 
are misdemeanors, which have laxer procedural requirements, there is no local rule 
of criminal procedure that obligates the parties to put a recitation of the factual basis 
for the plea into the record. Although the judge looks at the deal with some suspicion, 
he allows the plea to move forward. The defendant pleads guilty to three counts of a 
misdemeanor sex offense.  
The defendant has entered a fictional plea—a plea bargain agreement in which 
the defendant pleads guilty to a crime he did not commit, with the consent and 
knowledge of multiple actors in the criminal justice system—to avoid the profound 
collateral consequences that would flow from a conviction on his initial charge. In 
courtrooms across the country, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are 
allowing plea bargains to charges of conviction, which are completely disconnected 
from any factual allegations against the defendant. Such pleas are not new. Indeed, 
they have long been used to avoid strict criminal penalties associated with a particular 
charge.2 But in the “era of collateral consequences,”3 these fictional pleas have found 
new life.  
This is the contrast presented here: descriptively, this Article tells the story of 
individuals—individual prosecutors, defendants, defense attorneys, and judges 
—who are carefully tailoring decisions to meet the needs of parties in a particular 
case. But those individual stories explain something important about how the 
criminal justice system—as an institution—responds to this mass of cases. Although 
individual defendants may benefit profoundly from the use of a fictional plea, the 
fictional plea represents the distillation of a system that has become untethered from 
ideas of accuracy and truthfulness. The use of fictional pleas asks us to confront 
difficult questions about truth, prosecutorial power, and the legitimacy of the 
criminal system.  
                                                                                                                
2. See infra Section I.A. 
3. Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901, 905–908 (2017) 
(describing this moment as an “era of collateral consequences,” not because collateral 
consequences are a new phenomenon but because lawyers, judges, legislatures, and the public 
have become increasingly aware of the impact of such consequences).  
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But first, what gives the fictional plea new life at this moment? This Article 
proposes that such pleas provide defendants and prosecutors an opportunity to meet 
parallel aims that often cannot be achieved without their use. As the scope of 
collateral consequences expands,4 it becomes more difficult to negotiate around such 
consequences in any given case. There are many criminal cases in which the factual 
allegations against the defendant only support a single charge or a small universe of 
charges, which may all carry serious collateral consequences. For instance, most drug 
offenses are deportable offenses,5 and nearly all sex crimes now carry sex offender 
registration requirements.6 In such cases, the range of disposition options based on 
the facts of the case is limited. The fictional plea can help expand that range to 
include more potential resolutions that satisfy the needs of all parties to the 
negotiation. Specifically, fictional pleas allow prosecutors to hold defendants 
accountable in the criminal system, while not dooming those same defendants to the 
devastating collateral consequences that flow from many criminal convictions.  
The criminal system has become the first, and often only, place where there is any 
opportunity for individuals to avoid many of the subsequent, noncriminal sanctions 
that now attach to convictions. Immigration consequences provide the clearest 
example. The criminal courts are, as Stephen Lee notes, “de facto immigration 
courts.”7 Once a defendant has committed a deportable offense in the criminal system, 
there are very few ways to escape deportation in the immigration system. 8 The 
criminal system thus becomes the primary space for the noncitizen defendant to 
attempt to escape deportation. Much of that work is done through the fictional plea.  
Fictional pleas—through minor sleights of hand or outright manipulation of facts 
or law—avoid deportation and other collateral consequences, while allowing the 
prosecutor to secure a disposition in the criminal case. In this sense, they are an 
offshoot of the “creative plea bargaining” encouraged by Justice Stevens in Padilla 
v. Kentucky.9 Such creative bargaining, which involves negotiating around collateral 
consequences, is common among the players in the criminal system.10 Parties often 
use creative bargaining when the field of plea options based on the facts of the case 
are limited. Sometimes there are no options available based on the underlying facts 
of the allegation. In these cases, the attorneys must turn to fiction. This turn to fiction 
leads to a certain level of collusion among prosecutors and defense attorneys, and 
even judges, who accept pleas on the record that are unsupported by the factual 
allegations.  
But, as this Article proposes, although fictional pleas can be helpful for individual 
defendants, and even for judges or prosecutors, who are concerned about the creeping 
                                                                                                                
4. For a state-by-state guide to potential collateral consequences, see National Inventory 
of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST. GOV’T JUST. CTR., https:// 
niccc.csgjusticecenter.org [https://perma.cc/9RGT-JA4P]. 
5. See infra Section I.C.2. 
6. See infra Section I.C.3. 
7. Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2013).  
8. See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 671–80
(2015) (discussing the “unforgiving” nature of U.S. immigration law).
9. 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).  
10. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1772–75 (2013); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 119–22. 
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reach of noncriminal consequences into the realm of criminal law, the fictional plea 
as a trend symbolizes the criminal justice system’s abandonment of truth seeking as 
a function.  
This is the paradox. In individual cases, the fictional plea represents a legitimate 
response to the criminal system’s encroachment into other areas of the law, and the 
role of the prosecutor as “gatekeeper”11 to the immigration system, as well as the 
systems that regulate public housing, student aid, and public benefits. A fictional plea 
can save a defendant from being deported from the country, losing his job, or 
becoming a lifetime sex offender. And yet, as a trend within the criminal system, the 
fictional plea exemplifies what Julia Simon-Kerr has termed “systemic lying,” 
coordinated lying among many actors in the criminal justice system when there is a 
“strong and collective dissonance between moral beliefs and legal prescriptions.”12
Fictional pleas function in this dissonant space.  
Fictional pleas have become a necessary protection not only for defendants but 
also for those prosecutors who resist using criminal law as an enforcement arm in 
noncriminal arenas. Legislatures have created circumstances in which prosecutors 
feel compelled to assist defendants in securing “safe” pleas. These deals, like most 
plea bargains, occur under the radar. But increasingly district attorneys are 
proclaiming their resistance to punishing defendants twice—once for the criminal 
case, and another time by collateral consequence. Prosecutors are using their 
discretion to protect certain defendants as a form of protest against what many see as 
an unfair discrepancy between the penalties imposed on noncitizens versus citizens13
and on defendants who will be crippled by noncriminal sanctions. 
Part I of this Article describes the fictional plea in practice. In Section I.A, the 
Article explores the varied uses of fictions in plea bargaining and then defines the 
specific forms of the fictional plea in the context of collateral consequences. Each 
subsection of Section I.B then discusses how each party to the plea bargain 
—defendants, prosecutors, and judges—uses and benefits from the fictional plea. In 
particular, this Section focuses on the use of fictional pleas by a new sort of 
progressive district attorney emerging through the country, one who is open to 
seeking “immigration-safe” pleas for defendants. Section I.C explains how fictional 
pleas function as a safety valve in three types of cases: misdemeanors, drug cases, 
and sex offenses. For each, the Article explores why and how the fictional plea has 
taken hold and what it achieves for the defendant charged in these sorts of cases. Part 
II turns away from description of the practice and argues that the development of the 
                                                                                                                
11. Lee, supra note 7, at 553 (describing prosecutors as the “gatekeepers” to the 
immigration courts).   
12. Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 2179 (2015).  
13. See infra Section I.B.2; see also Corinne Ramey, Some Prosecutors Offer Plea Deals 
to Avoid Deportation of Noncitizens, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2017, 9:53 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-prosecutors-offer-plea-deals-to-avoid-deportation-of-
noncitizens-1499419802 [https://perma.cc/SVP5-WNQW] (noting that Cyrus Vance, District 
Attorney for Manhattan, justified his new Collateral Consequences Counsel position by 
proclaiming “I submit today that if two New Yorkers commit the same low-level violation, 
and the practical consequences for one of the New Yorkers is a ticket or a couple of days in 
jail, while the consequences for the other New Yorker is to be taken away from her family and 
shipped off to a foreign country, that is not equal justice under the law”). 
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fictional plea in response to mandatory collateral consequences is the natural end 
point of a system that has become untethered from its truth-seeking function. Section 
II.B also explores what these present fictions mean for the future “truths” they 
create—namely, the creation of a record of conviction—and argues that in avoiding 
one set of collateral consequences, the parties unwittingly put into play a new set of 
consequences that may have a similar or worse impact on the defendant. The Article 
concludes by offering some thoughts on alternative responses—beyond the fictional 
plea—to the injustices levied by mandatory collateral consequences.  
I. FICTIONAL PLEAS IN PRACTICE 
A. History and Terminology  
To define fictional pleas, this Article borrows a definition from a critic of the 
practice. A fictional plea is: 
a guilty plea, a factual admission of the elements of a crime . . . an 
‘admission of guilt for the purposes of the case,’ entered by a defendant 
for an offense that the defendant did not commit, and that all the parties 
in the case know the defendant did not commit.14  
Fictional pleas involve fictions of both fact and law. Most fictional pleas require 
the parties to manipulate or disregard altogether the facts underlying the 
allegations—this Article refers to these sorts of fictional pleas as “factual fictions.”
They start with a factual premise—usually a criminal complaint that is based on 
police reports, conversations with witnesses, and other evidence of the crime—and 
they end with a plea that has little to no relation to that initial complaint. In this way, 
they require the parties to abandon the alleged facts as they search for a resolution to 
the case.15 Other types of fictional pleas involve the creation of dispositions that do 
                                                                                                                
14. This was the definition that Mari Byrne gave to the term “baseless pleas” in her article, 
Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2966 (2010) (footnotes 
omitted) (citation omitted). Although this Article rejects the term “baseless pleas” in favor of 
“fictional pleas,” the underlying definition provided by Byrne captures the core of the fictional 
plea: an agreement by all parties that the defendant will plead to a crime he did not commit. 
Byrne also uses the term “fictional plea” in her article but defines it instead as “a situation in 
which a defendant is allowed to plead guilty to a crime that does not exist by criminal statute.” 
Id. at 2967 (footnote omitted). In this Article, such pleas are defined as fictions of law. See
infra Section I.A.2.  
15. It is important to note that this sort of abandonment of the facts is not limited to 
fictional pleas. Indeed, one sees attorneys ignoring or covering up facts to achieve a particular 
end, even before the Supreme Court. As Dale Carpenter lays out in his book Flagrant Conduct,
the real story behind the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas was quite different than the story 
told by the advocates at the Supreme Court. In fighting against anti-sodomy laws, the lawyers 
for the petitioners wove a tale of two men in love, sharing a moment of sexual intimacy, which 
had been interrupted by the state. But as Carpenter discovered, the initial arrest that led to 
Lawrence involved neither love nor sex, but two men who were arrested after a night of 
drinking and fighting in a small Texas apartment. Fictions surface in the legal system, then, in 
ways both big and small. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE 
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not actually exist in the law, what this Article refers to as “fictions of law.”16 These 
are distinguished from legal fictions, which are operational across the law. Fictions 
of law serve a one-time purpose: to transform a crime that would carry collateral 
consequences into one that will not for this defendant, at this moment. Even if 
fictions of law are used for more than one defendant, they are not transformed into a 
formal legal fiction.  
Examples of each of these types of fictional pleas will be developed in Section 
I.A.2 below, but to give these bargains context, it is important to understand the 
antecedents of the practice.  
1. A Brief Review of Fictions in Plea Bargaining 
Fictional pleas are not an invention of the era of collateral consequences, but they 
are being used in innovative ways to combat the growing reach of collateral 
consequences. There is both a history and critique of the use of fictions in plea 
bargaining that began before the increasing awareness of collateral consequences.  
There is an argument that plea bargaining itself is a type of fiction. Defendants 
are often asked at the time they plead guilty to affirm that they were not promised 
anything in exchange for their plea, even when the plea bargain often is a promise of 
benefits without which the defendant would not agree to plead.17 In addition, when 
an innocent person pleads guilty to a crime he did not commit, that plea can rightly 
be viewed as a fiction.18 Indeed, Josh Bowers contends that the criminal justice 
system should categorize the “false plea[]” of an innocent person who nonetheless 
pleads guilty to a crime as a legal fiction, allowing innocent defendants, like guilty 
defendants, to make the choice to plead guilty in order to secure the benefits of a 
plea. 19  Others have argued that plea bargaining in the shadow of mandatory 
minimums has created an environment in which innocent people regularly plead 
guilty to crimes they did not commit to avoid the risk of disproportionately long 
sentences that are required after trial under a mandatory sentencing scheme.20  
Additionally, many defense advocates condemn prosecutors’ rampant use of low-
level violations as a catchall to secure false convictions in weak cases. These 
violations are seen as a sort of fiction—an easy label to attach to a broad and diverse 
variety of conduct. In New York, for instance, there has been a long-standing critique 
of the overuse of pleas to disorderly conduct, a noncriminal violation.21 Although the 
                                                                                                                
V. TEXAS (2012).  
16. See infra Section I.A.2.
17. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1170 (2008). 
18. Id. at 1171–73; see also Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 1977, 1993–94 (2016) (arguing that “it cannot be taken as a given that a conviction 
correlates to the commission of a crime” and for that reason it is wrong-headed that witnesses 
in trials are allowed to be impeached by evidence of prior convictions). 
19. Id. at 1170. 
20. E.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of 
the Justice System, 61 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 63, 75–77 (2011); see also Jed. S. Rakoff, Why 
Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks 
.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty [https://perma.cc/8UN3-SNWR]. 
21. Steven Zeidman, Time to End Violation Pleas, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 2008, at 2. 
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disorderly conduct statute covers a range of behaviors, from taking up too much room 
on the sidewalk to being “unreasonably” loud,22 it is used as a one-size-fits-all sack 
for any number of cases to be stuffed into. For example, disorderly conduct is a 
common plea resolution in cases such as shoplifting and turnstile jumping.23  
Some might also see echoes of the fictional plea in the process of “fact bargaining,” 
which allows prosecutors to manipulate the relevant facts of a case to avoid 
mandatory minimum sentences in a particular case. 24 This practice is typical in 
federal drug cases where mandatory minimums are triggered by the allegation of 
certain drug quantities in the indictment.25 If the parties can agree to change the 
quantity of drugs listed, they can also change the potential sentence. Of course, that 
means allowing a defendant who was found with a large amount of cocaine to be 
formally charged with possessing a much smaller amount. There is an argument that 
this is not a direct falsehood—if a defendant possessed a hundred grams of cocaine, 
surely one could say he also possessed ten grams of cocaine. But the practice 
functions as a maneuver around the law, allowing the parties to tell only part of the 
                                                                                                                
22. Disorderly conduct is defined in New York as follows: 
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
1. He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or 
2. He makes unreasonable noise; or 
3. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene 
gesture; or 
4. Without lawful authority, he disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of 
persons; or 
5. He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or 
6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with 
a lawful order of the police to disperse; or 
7. He creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which 
serves no legitimate purpose.
Disorderly conduct is a violation. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2017). 
23. For instance, a local New York City lawyer and former Manhattan prosecutor, who 
blogs for his law firm’s website, lists a disorderly conduct violation as a typical offer in a 
shoplifting case involving more than $100 of goods but less than $500. Jeremy Saland, 
Arrested for Shoplifting (New York Penal Law 155.25 or 165.40): Potential Offers or Deals 
in Manhattan, CROTTY SALAND: N.Y. CRIM. LAW. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2010), https:// 
www.newyorkcriminallawyer-blog.com/2010/10/arrested-for-shoplifting-new-y.html 
[https://perma.cc/RTM3-YUWK]. 
24. Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How 
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 87, 120 (2003).  
25. This is made clear in a 2013 memo from Attorney General Eric Holder to Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys that instructed them to decline to charge the quantity of drugs necessary to 
trigger a mandatory minimum in certain cases where the defendant met a set of stringent 
criteria. ERIC HOLDER, OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION 2 (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department 
-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain 
-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU7Z-Z5GL]. 
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full story of the case—the story of ten grams, rather than a hundred. But parties may 
also swap in and out other facts—agreeing, for instance, to exclude from the formal 
charges the gun found at the scene or to not find a defendant to be a recidivist, even 
if he qualifies as one.26 Fact bargaining has been a regular practice for some time. A 
study of federal probation officers in 1996 found that “approximately forty percent 
of probation officers believe that [sentencing] guideline calculations set forth in plea 
agreements in a majority of cases are not ‘supported by offense facts that accurately 
and completely reflect all aspects of the case.’”27
Understanding the prior usage of fictions in plea bargaining provides some 
context for the use of fictional pleas, indicating that the term can be read both 
narrowly and broadly. This Article uses the definition given above—a defendant’s 
plea of guilty to a crime that all parties agree he did not commit—to discuss this 
practice.  
2. Types of Fictional Pleas  
This Article will focus on factual fictions. These are pleas in which the defendant 
pleads guilty to a charge that is not supported by the factual allegations underlying 
the arrest.28 The other category, which is found much less frequently, is what I call 
fictions of law.29 These are cases where the defendant pleads guilty to a nonexistent 
                                                                                                                
26. See, e.g., id. at 2–3 (directing Assistant United States Attorneys to decline to charge 
the defendant as a recidivist in certain cases).  
27. David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What 
They See, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996).  
28. This Article excludes from this category Alford pleas or pleas of nolo contendere,
which allow defendants to accept a guilty plea while either actively claiming innocence or not 
admitting guilt. In these cases, even if the defendant contests his guilt, the initial factual 
allegations generally support the charge. The Alford case itself demonstrates the point. The 
Supreme Court upheld the plea in North Carolina v. Alford because the plea was made 
knowingly and voluntarily and was supported by a strong factual basis. 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970); 
see also People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 419–20 (Cal. 1970) (accepting a plea of nolo 
contendere because “[t]he court may accept a bargained plea of guilty or nolo contendere to 
any lesser offense reasonably related to the offense charged in the accusatory pleading”). In 
addition, when a defendant enters into an Alford and nolo contendere plea, such an agreement 
is clear from the record. As discussed in greater depth in Section II.B, fictional pleas create a 
false record for future downstream actors. In this sense, Alford and nolo contendere pleas do 
not fit within the narrow definition of fictional pleas. These pleas have, though, been critiqued 
for their fictitious nature. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law 
Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1361 (2003) (arguing that these pleas undermine legal values and community norms); 
Curtis J. Shipley, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal 
Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (1987). 
29. There are many forms of fictions discussed in this Article. Yet another fiction recently 
identified by Jessica S. Henry are convictions based on crimes that never occurred. Jessica S. 
Henry, Smoke but No Fire: When Innocent People are Wrongly Convicted of Crimes That 
Never Happened, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 665, 666 (2018) (finding that nearly one-third of 
exonerations since 1989 involve no-crime convictions). Although this Article will not discuss 
such fictions here, identifying the many fictional convictions in the criminal system gives 
some sense of the scope of the issue. 
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crime, meaning a crime that is not found in the statutes. I call these pleas fictions of 
law rather than “legal fictions” to denote that they are different from formal legal 
fictions, a commonly used device within the legal system.30 Fictions of law are likely 
more rare because they are both easier for judges to spot and to object to than factual 
fictions. Even so, fictions of law or pleas to nonexistent crimes can be found in the 
case law.31
The line between factual fictions and fictions of law, however, is flexible. Even 
given the elasticity of the terms, the definitions here provide a foothold for exploring 
the nuances of the use of fictions in practice. Because factual fictions are more 
common—both in practice and in case law—they provide the richest backdrop for 
study.  
So what does a fictional plea look like in the age of collateral consequences? Here 
is one example recounted by a defense attorney in Washington state32: a noncitizen 
defendant in a criminal case is faced with a marijuana charge. The defendant fears
that—beyond any criminal penalty for the charge—the conviction will make him 
deportable from the United States. After negotiations with the prosecutor, his 
attorney arranges a plea to an alternative charge of inhaling toxic fumes, which is a 
charge of equal weight under the local state law, but one that does not carry any 
potential deportation consequence. He pleads guilty and serves his sentence, the 
crisis of his potential deportation averted.  
By definition, inhaling toxic fumes does not include the use of marijuana.33 There 
was, therefore, no factual basis in the law for such a charge. And yet, the defendant, 
                                                                                                                
30. See infra Part II for a discussion of legal fictions in more detail. 
31. Some courts have supported the practice. See, e.g., Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309 
(Del. 1988) (finding that a defendant may plead guilty to a nonexistent crime where he receives 
a benefit); People v. Myrieckes, 734 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (same); McPherson 
v. State, 163 P.3d 1257, 1262–63 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant may plead no contest to a 
nonexistent crime as part of a negotiated plea); Spencer v. State, 942 P.2d 646, 649 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding that a defendant who was charged with a valid crime, attempted 
aggravated assault, “may, pursuant to a beneficial plea agreement knowingly entered, plead 
guilty to a nonexistent crime”); People v. Genes, 227 N.W.2d 241, 243  (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) 
(defendant could plead to an attempt crime, even though no conviction on the same charge 
would be available). But a defendant may not be convicted of a nonexistent crime by a jury. 
See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278 (N.Y. 1993) (“While we will allow a 
defendant to plead to a nonexistent crime in satisfaction of an indictment charging a crime 
with a heavier penalty, . . . [f]or a conviction, a jury must find the defendant guilty of each 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but could not do so here because an element 
of attempted manslaughter in the first degree as charged is an unintended result that as a matter 
of law cannot be attempted.” (citations omitted)). Still other courts have found that pleas to 
nonexistent offenses are not valid. People v. Stephenson, 30 P.3d 715, 716–17 (Colo. App. 
2000) (finding that the defendant could not be convicted of “attempted felony murder” because 
such a crime was not recognized as a statutory offense); In re Personal Restraint of Thompson, 
10 P.3d 380, 385 (Wash. 2000) (holding that since a plea must be knowing and voluntary on 
the part of the defendant, a plea to a nonexistent crime fails to satisfy the knowledge 
requirement).  
32. This example is taken from an interview with a public defender in Johnson, supra 
note 3, at 925. 
33. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.47A.010 (West 2010). 
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defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge all agreed to the plea and entered it into the 
record. In this case, the fictional plea was used to avoid deportation, which is a 
noncriminal penalty imposed for conduct covered under the criminal code. 
Like the example given in the Introduction, this case demonstrates the nature of 
the factually fictional plea in a case involving collateral consequences. The purpose 
of both plea bargains was to avoid a particular noncriminal consequence 
—deportation in the one case and sex offender registration and a felony record34 in 
the other. In both cases, all actors in the system—defense attorney, prosecutor, and 
judge—were aware that the allegations did not support the conviction, and all parties 
agreed to allow the plea to proceed.  
As one can see in both examples, fictional pleas are an extension of the sort of 
creative bargaining that attorneys have been doing “around” collateral consequences. 
For instance, defense attorneys often look for ways to turn an intentional crime into 
a reckless crime. 35  This is because it is much more likely for a crime with an 
intentional mens rea component to be considered a deportable offense than a crime 
that requires a reckless state of mind.36 Defense attorneys report that this sleight of 
hand can often be achieved by swapping out one subsection of a particular statute for 
another.37 Additionally, even where the parties may not be able to change the statute 
under which the defendant pleads guilty, there is also a fair amount of negotiation 
over how to change the facts themselves—scrubbing the record of any facts that may 
cause trouble in later, noncriminal proceedings.38 Such scrubbing essentially puts 
attorneys—defenders, for the most part—in the role of fiction writer, creating a new 
factual narrative to be read into the record.  
Despite the embrace by attorneys of fictional pleas, there are few examples of the 
practice in case law, particularly in appellate opinions. There are some possible 
explanations for this. First, it may be that fewer cases involving bargains over 
collateral consequences are making their way to appeals courts. It is unlikely that 
defendants in these cases would want to appeal and risk that the conviction might be 
overturned, putting them back in the same precarious position where they began. For 
this reason, defense attorneys may counsel against an appeal. There may be other 
reasons to avoid an appeal. Defense attorneys are repeat players who may gain 
benefits for many clients by negotiating multiple times with the same prosecutor and 
office.39 One imagines that a defense attorney who secures a bargain that avoids 
collateral consequences through a fictional plea and then challenges the fictional plea 
                                                                                                                
34. Some defense attorneys consider a criminal record itself a form of collateral 
consequence since it (1) creates a stigma and (2) may impact any potential arrest or criminal 
case in the future. Johnson, supra note 3, at 907–08 n.30. 
35. Id. at 924. 
36. Amy Wolper, Note, Unconstitutional and Unnecessary: A Cost/Benefit Analysis of 
“Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1907, 1928–29 (2010) (noting that some courts interpret the “crimes involving moral 
turpitude” requirement for offenses triggering deportation, found in 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i), to require an “evil intent” that goes beyond mere intent to commit a crime).
37. Johnson, supra note 3, at 924–25.
38. Id. at 924.  
39. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2469 (2004). 
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may be unlikely to see similar offers in future cases. Additionally, it may also be that 
judges and lawyers are reluctant to put the nature of the quid pro quo on the record, 
and therefore the reason behind the bargain never enters the appeal. Indeed, trial 
judges themselves might not understand the nature of the exchange.  
But there are some examples of trial and appellate opinions acknowledging these 
fictions. For instance, a trial court in Virginia found that a defendant could 
“knowingly plead guilty to a crime that he factually did not commit” as long as he 
“fully understands that he could not otherwise be convicted of the . . . crime and 
asserts that he is entering the plea nonetheless for his own perceived benefit.”40 In 
that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and a Schedule I or II 
drug, instead of what he actually possessed, which was marijuana.41 In this way, he 
escaped the mandatory minimum associated with the crime he did commit and got 
the benefit of a mandatory minimum for a crime he did not commit.42 The court 
deemed this “legal fiction plea[]”43 totally acceptable.44 An intermediate appellate 
court in New York came to a similar conclusion.45 The court wrote of a defendant 
challenging his conviction to criminal trespass, “Defendant concedes he wanted to 
avoid the significant stigma of a conviction on the initial class A misdemeanor charge, 
an animal cruelty charge, and therefore pleaded guilty to second-degree trespass, also 
a class A misdemeanor, even though there was no common factual or legal predicate 
for that charge.”46 The court expressed no issue with the fact that defendant had 
pleaded guilty to a crime for which there was no basis, in order to avoid the 
“stigma”47 of an animal cruelty charge.48
In other instances, courts have taken issue with prosecutors’ attempts to avoid 
collateral consequences by manipulating pleas. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 
                                                                                                                
40. Commonwealth v. Ayala, No. FE-2018-541, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 125, at *1 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. July 20, 2018).
41. Id. at *2. 
42. Id.
43. Id. at *1; see also Rivera v. State, 952 A.2d 396, 409–13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) 
(allowing the defendant to plead guilty to a crime he could not have committed for the purpose 
of obtaining some other benefit); Rollison v. State, 552 S.E.2d 290, 292–93 (S.C. 2001) 
(approving a defendant’s guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, even though the facts did not 
support the conviction).  
44. Interestingly, the same court strongly disapproved of defendants pleading guilty to 
nonexistent crimes because “[o]nly the legislature can create a statutory crime or abrogate a
common law crime.” Ayala, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS, at *8.  
45. People v. Freeman, 149 A.D.3d 555, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
46. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s arguments on other grounds). 
47. Although stigma is not traditionally viewed as a collateral consequence, there are 
defense attorneys who consider the stigma of conviction a collateral consequence which 
should be avoided. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 907–08 n.30. 
48. There are also cases where judges acknowledged the use of factually fictional pleas 
where collateral consequences were not at issue. See, e.g., State v. Harrell, 513 N.W.2d 676, 
680 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (“[W]hen a plea is pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court is not 
required to go to the same length to determine whether the facts would support the charge as 
it would if there were no plea bargain. This latter rule reflects the reality that often in the 
context of a plea bargain, a plea is offered to a crime that does not closely match the conduct 
that the factual basis establishes.” (citation omitted)).  
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Disciplinary Board v. Howe, the Iowa Supreme Court found that a prosecutor had 
violated the rules of professional ethics by amending traffic citations to charge 
violations of a cowl-lamp49 statute that would not add points on defendants’ licenses. 
Although not as devastating as deportation or sex offender registration, the addition 
of points to one’s license is a common collateral consequence that most defendants 
in traffic cases wish to avoid. The court held that the attorney, Howe, had violated 
the ethical duties of a prosecutor that barred “institut[ing] . . . charges when the 
lawyer knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.”50
Throughout its opinion, the court rejected the attorney’s arguments that he had 
merely been engaged in mutually beneficial plea bargaining. It would not, however, 
go so far as to reject fictional pleas altogether, noting  
whether or not [a] guilty plea must be supported by a factual basis is a 
different question from whether or not the charge must be supported by 
probable cause. . . . The fact that a defendant may plead guilty to a traffic 
citation without a court determination that there is a factual basis for the 
plea simply heightens the duty on the prosecutor to file only those 
charges that are supported by probable cause.51  
It seemed then that the objection was to the procedure by which the prosecutor sought 
the deal with the defendants, rather than the deal itself.52  
B. Who Uses Fictional Pleas and Why?  
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court declared that defense attorneys must 
inform their clients about the clear deportation consequences of a conviction.53 In the 
opinion, Justice Stevens expressed a vision of plea bargaining that involved not just 
advising the client about potentially harsh immigration consequences but also 
assisting the client in escaping such consequences. As Justice Stevens noted, 
“[c]ounsel . . . may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to 
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by 
                                                                                                                
49. Cowl is defined as “the top portion of the front part of an automobile body forward of 
the two front doors to which are attached the windshield and instrument board.” Cowl,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993).  
50. Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 368 (Iowa 
2005). 
51. Id. at 368–69 (emphasis in original).  
52. The Iowa Supreme Court did seem to generally frown on the fictional plea, even if it 
had been achieved through the normal course of plea bargaining rather than through the 
prosecutor’s charging decisions. Id. at 371 (“Oftentimes in a plea bargain situation, probable 
cause will be supplied by the defendant’s admission. In the cases at issue here, however, any 
admissions by the persons charged were patently and indisputably unbelievable because no 
motor vehicle has more than two cowl lamps so as to violate the cowl-lamp statute. Probable 
cause cannot rest on such demonstrably false admissions.”). 
53. 559 U.S. 356, 369, 374–75 (2010) (deciding on Sixth Amendment grounds that 
defense counsel had a duty to give correct immigration advice to a noncitizen defendant when 
the law is clear about deportation consequences and finding that where law is not clear, the 
defense counsel should give a general warning).  
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avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal 
consequence.”54  
Although not explicitly stated in Padilla, such creative bargaining involves not 
just the defense attorney and his client but also the prosecutor and the judge who 
agree to allow the plea to proceed. The Court was and is certainly aware of this. 
Indeed, in companion cases that followed Padilla—Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. 
Cooper—the Court noted the many benefits that plea bargains afford the parties, 
including the resources saved by the prosecutor and courts.55 Justice Stevens, then, 
was not speaking only to defense attorneys in calling for creative bargains; he was 
also encouraging prosecutors and judges to accept these pleas.  
Fictional pleas are an extension of creative plea bargaining. There are times when 
there is very little overlap between the available options that would avoid a particular 
collateral consequence and the charges that can be supported by the factual 
allegations. In these cases, fictional pleas are used to achieve the purposes of the 
creative bargain. And, like all creative bargains, fictional pleas require agreement 
among three parties—the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge overseeing the 
plea. Such fictions, therefore, have the stamp of approval from each. As this Article 
explores below, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges reap different benefits 
and face different challenges in using fictional pleas.  
1. Defendants  
The benefit of the fictional plea to defendants is quite clear—the defendant avoids 
a particular severe collateral consequence that is a priority for him to avoid, which is 
sometimes a greater priority than avoiding prison time or more serious charges.56 It 
is still important to understand, however, that as an offshoot of creative plea 
bargaining, fictional pleas require a trade-off for the defendant that is sometimes 
different than the trade-off one sees in a “typical” plea bargain. In the typical plea 
bargain, the defendant generally accepts a lower charge or lower sentence in 
exchange for pleading guilty. The prosecutor saves precious resources, and the 
defendant gets a “better” deal than what he would receive if he went to trial and lost.57  
                                                                                                                
54. Id. at 373. This vision expressed by Justice Stevens has been adopted by other courts 
in explaining the duties of defense counsel when bargaining on behalf of a noncitizen client. 
See, e.g., Song v. United States, No. CV 09-5184 DOC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68465, at *11–
12 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (“Instead, Mr. Song could have asked Counsel to do what the 
Supreme Court urged counsel to do in Padilla: ‘plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in 
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by 
avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.’ 
Given that Mr. Song possessed information helpful to the prosecution at the time of entering 
into his plea deal, it is reasonably probable to assume that the government would have been 
willing to work with Mr. Song in order to formulate a plea agreement that did not render him 
automatically removable.” (citations omitted) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373).  
55. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144–45 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169 
(2012). 
56. See generally Johnson, supra note 3.  
57. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (“To note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize 
it. The potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their 
crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit 
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The creative plea bargain, however, involves a different sort of trade-off. The 
defendant pleads guilty—saving the prosecutor those same resources—but in 
exchange the defendant accepts more punishment or a higher charge than is typically 
offered in the same case or than the defendant may have been offered initially in the 
case. The purpose of this seemingly bad deal (for the defendant) is that the defendant 
will be able to avoid a severe collateral consequence, which is a concern for him.58  
The calculus behind the fictional plea is similar for the defendant. The defendant 
agrees to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit—creating a record of conduct he 
never performed—to sidestep some collateral consequence. His primary goal is 
averting the collateral consequences of the criminal charge, and he is willing to make 
trades to achieve that goal. Because the benefits to the defendant seem so clear, it is 
important to explore the potential downsides to this sort of plea bargaining for 
defendants. A positive outcome in any individual case may have many unintended 
consequences down the road. Again, one sees the profound paradox of the fictional 
plea: the immediacy (and often, profundity) of the payoff masks other hidden issues 
with pleading guilty to a fictional charge.  
Let’s return to the example that began this piece—the defendant who pleads to 
three misdemeanor sex offenses, rather than one felony sex offense. That defendant 
has gained a lot. It makes sense why his lawyer sought such a plea—the defendant 
has avoided a felony record, he has avoided lifetime sex offender registration, and he 
managed also to secure a shorter sentence. These three payoffs are likely worth the 
fiction he agreed to present to the court. But he should be mindful that now, instead 
of a single charge, the defendant has admitted to unlawful sexual touching on three 
occasions. What might this mean for his ability to secure bail in a future case? What 
might it mean if he is rearrested? Will he be seen as someone who has already 
committed three offenses and does not, therefore, deserve a “fourth” chance? This 
defendant now will walk through life with a false record of his conduct. This may be 
better than walking through life with an accurate record that results in sex offense 
registration. But, as this Article explores later, what might this false record mean for
individual defendants and for the system at large?  
In addition, innocent defendants may take advantage of the fictional plea in an 
effort to avoid a collateral consequence they should never have been subjected to in 
the first place because they are indeed innocent. This is, of course, a critique of plea 
bargaining more generally. Innocent defendants plead to get out of prison, to end 
long and costly litigation, or for any number of other reasons.59 But the fictional plea 
now creates yet another tool by which the prosecutor can tempt an innocent defendant 
into pleading guilty and thereby avoid some other serious, noncriminal consequence. 
While this piece explores the broader downsides of the fictional plea in a later Section, 
it is worth noting the specific downsides to individual defendants, who appear to be 
the beneficiaries of the fictional plea.  
                                                                                                                
both parties.”).
58. See id.  
59. NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration 
/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/CJ93-8LPX], provides dozens of examples of innocent 
defendants who pleaded guilty and were later exonerated. To search for cases that ended with 
a plea bargain, go to “Detailed View” and search under “Tags” by “P” by guilty plea. 
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2. Prosecutors  
Defense attorneys, of course, must negotiate fictional pleas with their counterparts 
across the aisle. Unlike the typical creative plea bargain, the fictional plea requires a 
certain level of collusion among defense attorneys and prosecutors. Prosecutors 
—aware that the charge does not match the factual allegations—must be prepared to 
defend their decision to offer the plea in the first place. A fictional plea can be a 
tricky bargain to strike.  
Although there is little direct evidence of prosecutors openly embracing fictional 
pleas, there is a great deal of circumstantial evidence about the use of fictional pleas 
by prosecutors to assist defendants in avoiding collateral consequences. As this 
Section explains, as a group of progressive prosecutors begins to draw national 
attention, there is a growing acceptance, among a certain group of prosecutors, that 
prosecutors should negotiate pleas that hold the defendant accountable in the 
criminal justice system, while not subjecting him to, what they see as, extreme 
punishment outside of the system.  
Prosecutors are accustomed to exercising their discretion freely and in ways that 
align with their judgment of “doing justice.” This involves, at times, not enforcing 
laws that do not align with their priorities.60 The regular use of plea bargains in a 
range of cases is part of this exercise of discretion. As William Stuntz noted, plea 
bargaining has little to do with the substantive law at issue in any given case and 
much more to do with a range of factors outside of the law, including, most critically,
the preferences of the prosecutor.61 The practice of fictional pleas is, therefore, very 
much in the prosecutor’s wheelhouse. 
In the case of fictional pleas, prosecutors are using their discretion to shape false 
narratives. They are lying on the record—either overtly or impliedly—with full 
knowledge of their false account. This is not to say that defense counsel and 
prosecutors always agree as to what constitutes the “facts” of a case. Indeed, there 
are many cases where there are legitimate disagreements about the answer to the 
question, “what happened?” and, relatedly, should the defendant be held responsible. 
But what happens in cases involving fictional pleas is that the parties essentially 
agree to the underlying facts, but then collude to find a plea that does not, in fact, 
relate to those facts.  
                                                                                                                
60. Marijuana enforcement at both the local and state level is an example of this exercise 
of discretion. Some state prosecutors have committed to decreasing marijuana prosecutions, 
even where police officers continue to make arrests. Brandon E. Patterson, Philadelphia’s New 
DA Found an Innovative Way to Legalize Pot––and Other Cities Should Pay Attention,
MOTHER JONES (Mar. 21, 2018, 2:27 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice 
/2018/03/philadelphias-new-da-found-an-innovative-way-to-legalize-pot-and-other-cities 
-should-pay-attention [https://perma.cc/2TM8-7C8W]. Under the Obama administration, the 
Justice Department pursued a policy of limited enforcement of federal marijuana laws. That 
policy has now been reversed by the Trump administration. Corky Siemaszko, Sessions To 
End Legal Marijuana Policy from Obama Era, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, 10:26 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/legal-pot/sessions-end-obama-era-policy-legalized 
-marijuana-n834591 [https://perma.cc/GCN7-GCMH].
61. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548–50 (2004).  
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i. The “New” District Attorney
As David Sklansky has documented, progressive prosecutors have been elected 
across the United States.62 These are prosecutors who made campaign promises to 
reduce incarceration63 and take police violence seriously.64 As this Section discusses, 
they are also seemingly committed to mitigating the punitive effects of certain 
collateral consequences.  
Even before this broader trend toward progressivism,65 many district attorneys’ 
offices had policies—either formal or informal—that allowed them to take into 
consideration collateral consequences during plea bargaining negotiations. Several 
local offices in California instituted policies to account for the impact of collateral 
consequences, especially on noncitizen defendants.66 In Los Angeles, for instance, 
prosecutors have had, for many years, a written policy that “explicitly allow[s them] 
to consider the adverse immigration consequences of deportation in arriving at an 
appropriate case disposition.”67 Additionally, the office has shown an openness to 
mitigating other collateral consequences outside of deportation. As one Los Angeles 
assistant district attorney noted, the office “weigh[s] collateral consequences on a 
‘sort of sliding scale’” in making decisions about how to proceed with cases.68
But in recent years, and certainly since the election of an administration 
obsessively focused on “criminal aliens,”69 an increasing number of district attorneys’ 
                                                                                                                
62. David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape]; 
David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 25 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, The Handbook]. There are, however, critics of the 
term—“progressive prosecutor”—who see it as public relations mechanism, more than a true 
statement of a particular district attorneys’ values. E.g., Josie Duffy Rice, Opinion, Cyrus 
Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/P6CF-GY4P] (criticizing several prosecutors who make claims about their 
progressivism but do little to end mass incarceration).  
63. Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape, supra note 62, at 647–48. 
64. Id.
65. As this Section makes clear, popular media has been particularly focused on the role 
of the “progressive prosecutor.” See, e.g., Christie Thompson, Prosecutors Are Quietly 
Helping Protect Immigrants from Trump, VICE (May 18, 2017, 12:00 AM), https:// 
www.vice.com/en_us/article/pg7wvn/prosecutors-are-quietly-helping-protect-immigrants 
-from-trump [https://perma.cc/JEV8-XKFK]. 
66. Ingrid Eagly documented these policies in her piece, Immigrant Protective Policies in 
Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245 (2016) [hereinafter Eagly, Immigrant Protective 
Policies]. She also compiled a library of these formal policies. Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigration 
Enforcement and Criminal Adjudication: Introduction, UCLA SCH. L., http://libguides 
.law.ucla.edu/immigrationandcriminaladjudication [https://perma.cc/37DW-2PWE] (last 
updated May 10, 2018). 
67. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies, supra note 66, at 266 (footnote omitted).  
68. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1164 (2013) (quoting an interview with a high-ranking 
prosecutor in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office). 
69. As an example, President Trump has put in place an office to assist “victims of crimes 
committed by criminal aliens.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., DHS Announces 
872 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 94:855 
offices have announced new policies regarding noncitizen defendants.70 In Brooklyn, 
the District Attorney has instituted a policy to limit immigration consequences for 
defendants facing low-level offenses.71 District Attorney Eric Gonzalez took over for 
Ken Thompson, who died unexpectedly in October of 2016 and was himself 
considered to be a “progressive prosecutor.”72 Gonzalez has been vocal that his office 
is specifically working to reach “immigration-neutral” dispositions.73 As an example, 
he cites his office’s willingness to allow a defendant in a shoplifting case to plead 
guilty to a disorderly conduct violation rather than petit larceny, which is a “crime of 
moral turpitude” under immigration law.74 But such a policy indicates that the formal 
directive from the office is that a line prosecutor should offer (or, at least, 
contemplate offering) disorderly conduct—a charge that does not include any theft 
                                                                                                                
Launch of New Office for Victims of Illegal Immigrant Crime (Apr. 26, 2017), https:// 
www.dhs.gov/news/2017/04/26/dhs-announces-launch-new-office-victims-illegal-immigrant 
-crime [https://perma.cc/UFG6-3KX6]. 
70. It is beyond the scope of this Article but worth noting that in California it is now the 
law that both prosecutors and defense attorneys take into consideration the impact on the 
defendant of any immigration consequences that stem from the criminal charge. The new law, 
which went into effect on January 1, 2016, reads:  
Immigration consequences; duties of counsel 
(a) Defense counsel shall provide accurate and affirmative advice about the 
immigration consequences of a proposed disposition, and when consistent with 
the goals of and with the informed consent of the defendant, and consistent with 
professional standards, defend against those consequences. 
(b) The prosecution, in the interests of justice, and in furtherance of the findings 
and declarations of Section 1016.2, shall consider the avoidance of adverse 
immigration consequences in the plea negotiation process as one factor in an 
effort to reach a just resolution. 
(c) This code section shall not be interpreted to change the requirements of 
Section 1016.5, including the requirement that no defendant shall be required to 
disclose his or her immigration status to the court. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.3 (West 2018). For a full discussion of changes to California that 
implicate many of these issues, including new rules regulating the negotiating of plea bargains 
see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California,
20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 12 (2017). 
71. Andrew Denney, Brooklyn DA Aiming to Limit Immigration Impact for Low-Level 
Offenders, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com
/id=1202784443346/Brooklyn-DA-Aiming-to-Limit-Immigration-Impact-for-LowLevel
-Offenders?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL [https://perma.cc/89RN-P72P]. These 
formal policies are new, but individual line prosecutors in Brooklyn would sometimes take 
into account collateral consequences during plea negotiations even without a formal policy. 
As Heidi Altman documented in her article, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the 
Pursuit of Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 28–32 (2012), individual line 
prosecutors in Brooklyn would sometimes take into account collateral consequences during 
plea negotiations, even without a formal policy. 
72. Alan Feuer, Ken Thompson’s Successor: A ‘Pure District Attorney’ Working Under 
the Radar, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/nyregion/
brooklyn-district-attorney-eric-gonzalez.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/6DK9-QV9Z]. 
73. Denney, supra note 71. 
74. Id.
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element—for the purpose of allowing the defendant to avoid collateral consequences. 
Although there is no mention of fictional pleas in the policy, such messages to line 
prosecutors indicate an openness to plea convictions that do not match the factual 
allegations.  
Other offices have followed suit. In Baltimore, the Chief Deputy State’s Attorney 
sent a memo to his staff informing them that the Justice Department’s deportation 
efforts under President Trump “have increased the potential collateral consequences 
to certain immigrants for minor, non-violent criminal conduct.”75 As a result, he 
directed the attorneys: “In considering the appropriate disposition of a minor, non-
violent criminal case, please be certain to consider those potential consequences to 
the victim, witnesses, and the defendant.”76 In Philadelphia, the current District 
Attorney is a longtime criminal defense attorney who is critical of the criminal justice 
system, including the impact of collateral consequences on defendants. 77  Dan 
Satterberg, the prosecuting attorney for Seattle and a Republican, instituted an 
immigration-consequences policy in his office in 2016, which, according to the New 
York Times, he “strengthened” after the election of President Trump.78 In explaining 
why he no longer thought it was appropriate to handle the cases of defendants facing 
immigration consequences the same way he handled other cases, he noted, “[M]ore 
and more, my eyes are open that treating people the same means that there isn’t a life 
sentence of deportation that might accompany [a] conviction.”79 Cyrus Vance, the 
District Attorney from Manhattan, made a similar statement in justifying a new 
Collateral Consequences Counsel position: “I submit today that if two New Yorkers 
commit the same low-level violation, and the practical consequences for one of the 
New Yorkers is a ticket or a couple of days in jail, while the consequences for the 
other New Yorker is to be taken away from her family and shipped off to a foreign 
country, that is not equal justice under the law.”80
                                                                                                                
75. Justin Fenton, Baltimore Prosecutors Told To Consider Consequences for
Prosecuting Illegal Immigrants for Minor Crimes, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 2017, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-states-attorney-immigrants
-20170428-story.html [https://perma.cc/6QVR-374P].
76. Id. (emphasis added); see also Collier Meyerson, Prosecutors Keep Their Jobs by 
Putting People in Jail. Can They Be Leaders in the Fight for Criminal-Justice Reform?,
NATION (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-keep-their-jobs-by
-putting-people-in-jail-can-they-be-leaders-in-the-fight-for-criminal-justice-reform [https://
perma.cc/G66V-VFP9].
77. Shaun King, Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner Promised a Criminal Justice Revolution. 
He’s Exceeding Expectations, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://theintercept 
.com/2018/03/20/larry-krasner-philadelphia-da [https://perma.cc/F83W-DZS4]; Sam 
Newhouse, Running to Change How Philadelphia Does Justice, METRO (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://www.metro.us/philadelphia/running-to-change-how-philly-does-justice/zsJqbt---GHf2 
Jnay4lLk [https://perma.cc/U8MZ-N2KY]. 
78. Vivian Yee, Prosecutors’ Dilemma: Will Conviction Lead to ‘Life Sentence of 
Deportation’?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/us 
/prosecutors-dilemma-will-conviction-lead-to-life-sentence-of-deportation.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HPD-WPT6]. 
79. Id.
80. Ramey, supra note 13.  
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These district attorneys—sometimes emboldened by Trump’s election—are 
shifting their policies to include explicit concern about the collateral consequences 
that may harm the defendant as the result of the plea bargain. As this Article explains 
in greater depth in Section II.B, in many cases there simply is no way to reach a plea 
that avoids serious collateral consequences and also lines up with the factual 
allegations against the defendant. It flows from these policies that prosecutors will 
be open to fictional pleas in certain cases where such a plea may be the only solution 
to holding the defendant accountable in the criminal system, while allowing him to 
sidestep particular sanctions outside of the system.  
It is also the critics of this practice who provide evidence that prosecutors are 
embracing the fictional plea. In recent debates in Ohio about adopting a state rule 
similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, critics pointed to the regular use 
of fictional pleas in sex offense cases. Justice Michael P. Donnelly of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, formerly a judge on the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, has 
argued for a local state rule that would require a recitation of the facts underlying any 
plea that is accepted by the court. As part of his evidence that his proposal is 
necessary, he cited 400 felony charges from 2008 to 2014 in sex-crimes cases that 
were reduced through plea bargains to non-sex-crime offenses.81 He noted that the 
most common reduced charges were abduction, felonious assault, or child 
endangerment82—all serious crimes that allow the defendant to avoid sex offender 
registration and do not necessarily involve a factual overlap with the underlying 
charges. 
ii. Benefits to Prosecutors  
As Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez has noted, the purpose of plea 
bargain policies that take into account collateral consequences is to “hold people 
accountable without their suffering enormous and disproportionate consequences for 
a low-level offense.”83 Gonzalez has said that he hopes these sorts of policies will 
become a model for prosecutors nationwide. 84  Particularly as the Trump 
                                                                                                                
81. The 400 number was generated by original research by Justice Donnelly. Rachel 
Dissell, Should Ohio Ban Judges from Allowing Plea Deals That Are ‘Lies’? (Poll),
CLEVELAND.COM (May 30, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2015/05 
/should_ohio_change_what_plea_d.html [https://perma.cc/G8TW-RLJA]. 
82. Id.
83. Q & A with Brooklyn Acting District Attorney Eric Gonzalez, OUR TIME PRESS (July 
16, 2017), http://www.ourtimepress.com/q-a-with-brooklyn-acting-district-attorney-eric-
gonzalez [https://perma.cc/4W5M-QR6H]. In a later interview with the Wall Street Journal,
Gonzalez noted that one of his inspirations for this formal policy was the case of a Brooklyn 
man who was arrested for being “unescorted in an apartment building” and then later found to 
have a small amount of crack cocaine on him. The man, a green card holder from Haiti, pleaded 
guilty to the drug possession charge and was eventually unable to reenter the country after a 
trip outside of the country. According to Gonzalez, he could have, instead, pleaded guilty to 
trespass and would not have been barred from the United States. This is an example where a 
creative plea bargain to a particular crime would have been available that lined up with the 
factual allegations against the defendant. Ramey, supra note 13. 
84. Christina Carrega, Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez Launches Campaign with Plan To 
Ditch Old Summons Warrants, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017, 4:21 PM), http:// 
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administration advances more aggressive “law and order” policies directed towards 
immigrants,85 we are likely to see more local offices responding with a softening of 
their respective policies towards defendants facing collateral consequences.  
Prosecutors reap political benefits by using fictional pleas. In places like Brooklyn, 
Baltimore, and Philadelphia where a growing number of voters are concerned about 
mass incarceration and the treatment of defendants,86 embracing these policies shows 
that prosecutors can enforce the criminal law, while not having defendants “suffer 
enormous and disproportionate consequences.” This is likely why prosecutors are 
not shy about such policies. Prosecutors have recently given interviews to the New 
York Times, the Washington Post, and other publications to champion these 
policies.87 In doing so, they are making political statements that they are in a tight 
spot between their obligations to enforce criminal law and their view that criminal 
law is being manipulated for other purposes. They are wiggling out of this tight spot 
by creating policies that rein in the consequences of criminal convictions. 
The other political benefit at this particular moment is making a clear statement 
against the policies of an unpopular federal government. There is a sense that these 
policies serve as a form of resistance to the current administration’s stance on a wide
range of criminal justice issues. The federal system has seen a shift from an 
administration devoted to criminal justice reform to one that is antagonistic to it. The 
Department of Justice under President Obama granted a record number of federal 
inmates early release under a highly publicized clemency effort, 88  softened its 
charging policies on drug laws, 89  and pursued a massive sentencing reform 
initiative.90 The Trump administration has struck a notably different tone. Former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions threw out old policies on charging in drug cases91
and talked of fully prosecuting individuals on marijuana charges in states where it is 
legal under state law.92
                                                                                                                
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/gonzalez-launches-brooklyn-district-attorney-campaign 
-article-1.3103917 [https://perma.cc/5UHB-ETYV]. 
85. The President has suggested as part of a “law and order” agenda on immigration that 
the United States deny due process to noncitizens entering the country. Benjamin Hart, Trump 
Suggests Suspending Rule of Law for Undocumented Immigrants, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER
(June 24, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/06/trump-floats-suspending-laws-
for-undocumented-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/KB2Z-B7US]. 
86. See supra Section I.B.1. 
87. Many of the quotes from prosecutors in this Section have come from articles in 
national publications. See, e.g., Ramey, supra note 13.
88. Sari Horwitz, Obama to Commute Hundreds of Federal Drug Sentences in Final 
Grants of Clemency, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/world/national-security/obama-to-commute-hundreds-of-federal-drug-sentences-in-final 
-grants-of-clemency/2017/01/16/c99b4ba6-da5e-11e6-b8b2-cb5164beba6b_story.html?utm 
_term=.e94a6f57f554 [https://perma.cc/U9L7-RVGG]. 
89. HOLDER, supra note 25. 
90. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015). 
91. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions on Department Charging 
and Sentencing Policy to All Federal Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), https://www 
.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/53WY-C3HF]. 
92. See Press Release, White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing 
H.R. 244 into Law (May 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements 
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Much of this change in tone has little impact on the functioning of state criminal 
justice systems. It has, however, resulted in increasing pressure on progressive state 
prosecutors to publicly stand in opposition to the harsh approach to defendants by 
federal prosecutors. This “new prosecutor” is progressive on many fronts, including 
charging, sentencing, and an openness to diversion. 93  However, even state 
prosecutors who would not consider themselves particularly progressive have been 
moved to change policy, at least in part by President Trump’s insistence that state 
law enforcement cooperate with federal immigration authorities.94 The federal focus 
on immigration has shined a spotlight on the devastating effects of collateral 
consequences, even though those effects were just as devastating before Trump’s 
election. 
Finally, it is important to note that certainly not all prosecutors are engaged in this 
practice. As Brian McIntyre, the county attorney for Cochise County, Arizona, noted 
in an interview, his prosecutors are not to consider collateral consequences so as not 
to benefit some defendants over others.95 Some prosecutors may even go a step 
further, specifically seeking to impose collateral consequences on certain defendants. 
Indeed, as Paul Crane has observed, district attorneys may use collateral 
consequences strategically, “undercharging” in certain cases in order to secure “the 
penalty they desire” without having to deal with the greater procedural safeguards in 
place for felony charges.96 Unlike felony cases, for example, where prosecutors are 
obligated to present witnesses and evidence to grand juries in probable cause 
hearings or to judges in preliminary hearings, misdemeanor cases do not have this 
requirement. Even when a defendant is facing significant collateral consequences, 
prosecutors may initiate misdemeanor cases without a grand jury proceeding.97 As
Eisha Jain argues, prosecutors have “powerful incentives to ‘prosecute’ collateral 
consequences—meaning that they at times use their vast and unreviewable discretion 
over the criminal justice system to shape civil outcomes.”98  
3. Judges  
What then is the motivation for judges to accept fictional pleas? One reason might 
be that judges, like defendants and prosecutors, are accustomed to the regular use of 
plea bargaining. Judges, like other stakeholders, benefit from the typical plea bargain. 
Plea bargains keep the system moving along at a regular clip. This benefit is 
particularly critical in those jurisdictions where the dockets are already swollen with 
cases. As Michelle Alexander has noted, if you want to “crash the system,” go to 
                                                                                                                
/statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-h-r-244-law [https://perma.cc/XE4E-82VU]. 
93. See supra Section I.B.2.i. 
94. See supra Section I.B.2.i. 
95. Yee, supra note 78 (“If he made accommodations for an immigrant, Mr. McIntyre 
said, he felt that he would also owe a citizen in similar circumstances the same option, ‘because 
is he not being, essentially, negatively impacted by his U.S. citizenry?’”). 
96. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 780, 782 
(2016).  
97. Id. at 802–03.
98. Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1200 (2016). 
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trial.99 Plea bargains avoid this outcome. Judges, therefore, have a strong interest in 
making sure that pleas are accepted.  
Although the role of a judge varies by jurisdiction, formally, judges have little 
role in the plea bargaining process. A judge must confirm that the defendant is 
pleading guilty both knowingly and voluntarily,100 but generally that is where their 
participation appears to end. Most states and the federal system prohibit the judge 
from participating in the negotiation of a plea bargain. It is plausible then that judges 
accept fictional pleas because their traditional role in this regard has been to stamp 
approval on the agreements of the parties, without much inquiry into the nature of 
the deal.101  
But this view of judges seems too limited and does not fully explain why judges 
accept fictional pleas—bargains where the plea of conviction does not match any of 
the factual allegations against the defendant. One explanation might be that judges 
are not always aware that they are accepting a fictional plea. Because some cases, 
particularly misdemeanors, do not require a full factual record be developed,102 it
might be the case that judges do not know that a particular plea is a fictional plea. In 
states where there is no requirement that the parties put a factual basis for the plea 
on the record, there is the risk that the judge has no idea how the parties reached 
agreement.103 Indeed, in the process of investigation, it is common for prosecutors to 
discover additional facts and evidence. With such discovery, the negotiations with 
the defendant may evolve, leading to a plea bargain that looks very different from 
the charges in the initial complaint.104  
But what about cases—like the one described in the Introduction to this piece—
where the judge inquires or is made aware of the fiction? A recent groundbreaking 
study by Nancy King and Ronald Wright makes clear that many more judges likely 
fall into this “active” category (i.e., judges who participate in the plea bargaining 
among the parties) than most scholars previously thought. As King and Wright 
observe in their study, there are many potential benefits to judicial involvement in 
plea bargaining.105 As a result, despite the common wisdom that judges take a hands-
                                                                                                                
99. Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice 
-system.html [https://perma.cc/9UCJ-4PRX]. 
100. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970).  
101. At least one scholar has proposed that parties litigate a pre-plea motion that would 
give judges more control over the plea system and therefore more guidance to defendants 
about their options. E.g., Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 65 (2015).  
102. See infra Section I.C.1. 
103. Author’s phone interview with Justice Michael P. Donnelly, Supreme Court of Ohio 
(Jan. 12, 2018) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
104. As noted in Section I.A.1, it is more difficult to “see” a factual fiction than a fiction 
of law, which requires the judge to sign off on a plea to a nonexistent crime. In those cases, 
there is little chance that a judge would not realize that the defendant is pleading guilty to a 
fiction.  
105. As King and Wright observed in their study, there are several seeming benefits of 
judicial involvement in plea bargaining. As they note, “judicial participation accelerates pleas, 
shifting deals away from the eve of trial to earlier in the process.” Nancy J. King & Ronald F. 
Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial 
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off approach to these agreements, they may indeed be actively involved and like the 
judge in the Introduction, may also understand that they are accepting a fictional plea 
on the record.106 As Darryl K. Brown notes, the vision of judicial participation at plea 
bargaining laid out by King and Wright is of a judge who is less “managerial” and 
more “inquisitorial”—one who gets into the mix of litigation.107
So why do judges—as neutral arbiters of the process—participate in fictional 
pleas? (Of course, there are judges for whom active judging means they do not accept 
fictional pleas.)108 One reason may be that, like other forms of plea bargaining, they 
are efficient. As King and Wright point out, docket control is a strong motivator for 
judges to become involved in the plea bargain process.109 Because fictional pleas are 
often the only solution that will satisfy both the needs of the defendant—to avoid 
collateral consequences—and the needs of the prosecutor—to hold the defendant 
accountable within the system without a trial—the fictional plea can be the final 
development before the parties are forced to go to trial. For instance, many 
defendants will roll the dice at trial rather than accept a plea of conviction to a 
deportable offense.110 Because many fictional pleas are meant to avoid trials, they 
are also appealing to a judge who wants to keep cases moving off his docket.  
In addition, the same zeitgeist around collateral consequences that has gripped 
lawyers and the public at large has certainly also had an impact on judges. Reaction 
to federal immigration law produces one of the clearest examples. In Padilla, Justice 
Stevens acknowledged the realities facing noncitizens, including that immigration 
judges have limited discretion to grant noncitizens relief from removal. 111 Such 
limitations on immigration judges create new incentives for criminal court judges, 
who interact so frequently with defendants facing deportable offenses, to become 
more proactive in seeking solutions for these noncitizens. It is now common 
knowledge that there will be no opportunities for these defendants to seek relief 
                                                                                                                
Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 393 (2016). This results in a more efficient 
system. In addition, when “judges are invited to help resolve a criminal case, they sometimes 
propose alternative ideas for sentencing that the parties had overlooked.” Id. at 394. 
Additionally, “judge’s participation also appears to help attorneys retain the confidence of 
clients, victims, and other constituencies.” Id. at 395. Finally, “[j]udicial participation can 
increase, rather than decrease, the amount of information available to the defense at the 
negotiation stage.” Id. at 396.  
106. But see Darryl K. Brown, Response, What’s the Matter with Kansas—And Utah?: 
Explaining Judicial Interventions in Plea Bargaining, 95 TEX. L. REV. 47, 52–59 (2017) 
(explaining how rules of criminal procedure in Kansas and Utah make judicial participation at 
plea bargaining less likely). 
107. Id. at 59–61.  
108. Interview with Justice Michael Donnelly, supra note 103 (noting that he makes the 
parties discuss all plea bargaining decisions on the record, requires a factual basis for each 
plea, and does not accept pleas where no such basis exists).  
109. See King & Wright, supra note 105, at 356–57. 
110. This question—whether a noncitizen defendant would go to trial, even in the face of 
overwhelming evidence against him, where he was facing a deportable charge—was the 
question before the Supreme Court in Lee v. United States. 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1962 (2017). As 
the defendant in Lee argued, successfully, before the Supreme Court, indeed it is a rational 
choice for a defendant to take the risk of trial rather than agree to being deported. Id. at 1969.   
111. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010). 
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elsewhere. The judge who rejects a plea bargain because it is a fiction, must, in many 
cases, face the possibility that the defendant before him will be deported. One can 
see courts openly grappling with some of these issues in sentencing matters where 
the defendant is also facing serious collateral consequences—should a judge take this 
“outside” factor into account when sentencing the defendant for his criminal case?112
As Jessica Roth has observed, many federal trial judges are becoming increasingly 
open about their desire to see criminal justice reforms put into place.113 This “new” 
activism conflicts with traditional expectations for how judges behave but appears to 
be motivated, in part, about concerns over the collateral consequences of a 
conviction.114 As Roth notes, several judges in either panel discussions, extrajudicial 
writings, or legal opinions have expressed deep concern about collateral 
consequences.115 This open call for reform includes two opinions by Judge Gleeson 
of the Eastern District of New York, in which he granted expungement of a criminal 
conviction and a “certificat[ion] of rehabilitation” to two defendants who made 
compelling claims that their convictions were harming their prospects for 
employment. 116  There are also dramatic examples of state and federal judges 
expressing their disdain for the immigration policies of the current administration.117
                                                                                                                
112. See, e.g., United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 474–75 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
the loss of the defendant’s “teaching certificate and his state pension as a result of his conduct” 
were appropriate sentencing considerations); United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 
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114. Id. at 198–202. 
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110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Doe v. United States (Doe II), 168 F. Supp. 3d 427 
(E.D.N.Y 2016)).  
117. See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Federal Judge Blasts ICE for ‘Cruel’ Tactics, Frees 
Immigrant Rights Activist Ravi Ragbir, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/01/29/federal-judge-blasts-ice-for-cruel 
-tactics-frees-immigrant-rights-activist-ravi-ragbir/?utm_term=.e7806dc0ca7d [https://perma 
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Such examples of judges’ open sympathy for the plight of defendants facing severe 
collateral consequences provide some evidence that judges, already inclined to 
accept the agreement of the parties, may not feel compelled to put an end to the 
workaround that fictional pleas provide.  
  
C. Common Examples of the Fictional Plea  
The criminal system has become a repository for a staggering number of sanctions 
and punishments—both criminal and noncriminal. Under a theory that the criminal 
system has identified those deserving of punishment, legislatures have piled high the 
number of sanctions for any given charge. This Section traces the three scenarios in 
which fictional pleas are used to greatest effect: low-level offenses, drug crimes, and 
sex offenses.
1. Low-Level Offenses 
Criminal grounds for deportation of immigrants, including lawful permanent 
residents, have become so expansive that various low-level offenses and virtually all 
controlled substance offenses will lead to removal. 118  There is a common 
understanding among scholars and advocates alike that misdemeanors carry with 
them substantial and serious collateral consequences. One only needs to peruse the 
American Bar Association’s exhaustive list of collateral consequences 119  to 
understand how many seemingly petty criminal offenses lead to non-petty 
consequences outside of the criminal system. A conviction for turnstile jumping, 
theft of a ten-dollar video game, forging a check for less than twenty dollars, 
misdemeanor indecent exposure, and petty shoplifting are all examples of minor 
offenses considered crimes of “moral turpitude” under immigration law120 that could 
                                                                                                                
.0b93f53d2380 [https://perma.cc/R6HY-SLPW]. 
118. Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 252 
(2017); Jordan Cunnings, Comment, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: 
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119. See COUNCIL ST. GOV’T JUST. CTR., supra note 4. 
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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render a noncitizen deportable.121 Traffic convictions are the “single largest source 
of the rise in criminal alien removals over the past decade.”122
Although they carry profound noncriminal consequences, low-level offenses have 
the benefit of offering much more flexibility to negotiate around collateral 
consequences than felonies for a few reasons. First, the stakes at sentencing are lower 
in misdemeanor cases, for the defendant and the prosecutor. Indeed, sentences tend 
to be shorter in misdemeanor cases.123 As a result, the sentence itself may be less 
important to the defendant than avoiding the collateral consequence. Conversely, a 
defendant may care very much about his sentencing exposure if he is facing serious 
prison time, shifting his goal from avoiding a particular collateral consequence to 
reducing his sentence. For the prosecutor, higher potential sentences and more 
serious criminal charges may mean she is less inclined to make deals around 
collateral consequences.124 It is more palatable for prosecutors to negotiate (or admit 
to negotiating) around collateral consequences when dealing with misdemeanors. As 
one prosecutor noted, consideration of collateral consequences “will not be extended 
to serious or violent crimes.”125  
Second, as noted, there tend to be fewer procedural restrictions on misdemeanor 
pleas as compared to felonies. The New York case of People v. Keizer makes the 
point. There, the defendant was charged with petit larceny for shoplifting books from 
a Barnes & Noble.126 At arraignment he pleaded to disorderly conduct in exchange 
for a conditional discharge. The defendant appealed, arguing that the plea was 
jurisdictionally defective because he pleaded to an offense that was neither charged 
in the complaint nor constituted a lesser included offense.127 The New York Court of 
Appeals found that  
                                                                                                                
121. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1759 (2013); see also Jillian T. Stein, Immigration Considerations 
for Noncitizens in Criminal Cases, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2017, at 66, 68 (“[E]ven turnstile jumping 
qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude and can subject a noncitizen to removal.”); Glenn E. 
Martin, A Breakthrough Twist of the Turnstile from Manhattan DA Cy Vance, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (July 19, 2017, 12: 28 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/breakthrough-twist-
turnstile-manhattan-da-cy-vance-article-1.3338588 [https://perma.cc/F9TQ-KMW8] (noting 
that pleading guilty to turnstile jumping can result in collateral consequences, including 
deportation); James C. McKinley, Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to Court 
May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30 
/nyregion/subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/8Z8D-S9J9] (pointing out 
that criminal prosecution of fare evasion may put immigrants at risk of deportation). 
122. Eagly, supra note 68, at 1218 (“[T]he category of criminal aliens removed as a result 
of a traffic offense increased ten-fold over the past decade, accounting for nearly thirty percent 
of the overall rise in criminal alien removals.”). 
123. See generally Johnson, supra note 3, at 927–30 (discussing the reasons that it is easier 
to plead around collateral consequences on misdemeanor cases rather than felony cases).  
124. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 930–31.  
125. Yee, supra note 78. 
126. 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (N.Y. 2003).  
127. Id. at 1151; see also People v. Peralta, Nos. 57068/01, 01-392, 2003 WL 21174608, 
at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 29, 2003) (per curiam) (holding that a plea to disorderly conduct 
“in satisfaction of an information charging him with several marihuana-related offenses” was 
not jurisdictionally deficient).  
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[a] prosecutor cannot bring an indictment or felony complaint and then 
attempt to avoid [certain] protections . . . by soliciting a plea to alleged 
criminal activity that has no common element (in law or fact) to the 
crimes alleged in the indictment or felony complaint. By contrast, 
[Keizer] concerns misdemeanors . . . . The specific constitutional 
limitations, and their underlying policies, that restrict the plea process for
felony charges are not present here.128  
As Keizer demonstrates, misdemeanor pleas often do not require the same procedural 
hurdles as felony pleas.129
Third, there are more options for alternatives to incarceration in misdemeanor 
court.130 That means that there are greater opportunities for defense counsel to trade 
on the punishment end when trying to secure a fictional plea. As a result, prosecutors 
are more likely to play ball. As Jeff Rosen, the district attorney in Santa Clara, 
California, has noted, his office is often willing to trade a lesser charge for more jail 
or probation: “If we’re giving something, we’re going to get something.”131 In fact, 
defense attorneys report that prosecutors are more willing to discuss the mitigation 
of collateral consequences on lower-level offenses as opposed to felonies because of 
these greater options.132 For these reasons, in misdemeanor cases, defendants may be 
more likely to negotiate around collateral consequences, and prosecutors may be 
more open to fictional pleas.  
Partly, this is made possible by the nature of misdemeanors and other low-level 
crimes. As the Keizer court made clear, misdemeanors tend not to require a full 
factual record—or any record—be made at the time of the plea.133 As a result, “the 
reality [is] that often in the context of a plea bargain, a plea is offered to a crime that 
does not closely match the conduct that the factual basis establishes.”134 The lack of 
a factual basis in most misdemeanor plea colloquies means that there is more room 
for the fictional plea. 
And although usually used against defendants, the dearth of safeguards allows for 
prosecutors to manipulate misdemeanors to benefit defendants. 135 Petty offenses 
provide a relatively easy way for prosecutors to demonstrate leniency and mercy in 
a low-stakes context. There have been several recent calls for prosecutors to end 
prosecutions against noncitizens in petty offense cases.136 A prosecutor might not be 
                                                                                                                
128. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d at 1152. 
129. A lower court in New York relied on Keizer in finding that a defendant, who was 
alleged to have been sitting in his running car while intoxicated and charged with driving while 
intoxicated, could plead to reckless driving, as long as the record for the proposed disposition 
was placed on the record. People v. Crandall, 39 A.D.3d 1077, 1077–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).  
130. As the below discussion of United States v. Lee demonstrates, when a defendant 
pleads to a misdemeanor, the range of possible attached punishments is wide ranging 
compared to a plea to a felony. See infra Section I.C.2.  
131. Yee, supra note 78. 
132. Johnson, supra note 3, at 931–34.
133. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d at 1154. 
134. State v. Harrell, 513 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).  
135. See Crane, supra note 96, at 806–11, 828. 
136. See, e.g., Protect NY Immigrants from Trump! Halt Broken Windows!, MOVE ON,
https://petitions.moveon.org/sign/protect-ny-immigrants [https://perma.cc/Z2PH-ZK29] 
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willing to give up the opportunity to prosecute a defendant altogether but may very 
well be willing to resolve the matter with a fictional plea. Given the flexibility that 
low-level cases provide, it is not surprising that fictional pleas are more frequently 
found in misdemeanor court.  
2. Drug Crimes 
Virtually all drug crimes—both misdemeanor and felony—are removable 
offenses under immigration law.137 Whole families have been kicked out of public 
housing because one member of the family used marijuana.138 Young people have 
lost student aid for low-level drug possession offenses.139 As Gabriel J. Chin has 
noted, “drug offenses are subjected to more and harsher collateral consequences than 
any other category of crime.”140  
And drug offenses are also incredibly broad, covering a huge range of conduct. 
For instance, in New York, to “sell” drugs means to “sell, exchange, give or dispose 
of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same.”141 Under federal law, to “distribute” 
means to deliver.142 Thus, sharing drugs with a friend makes one guilty of “criminal 
sale” in New York and “distribution” under federal law. It also makes one deportable 
and subject to a host of other collateral consequences.  
Thanks to Padilla and its progeny, the immigration consequences of drug crimes 
are particularly well known to criminal lawyers. Padilla made clear that defense 
attorneys were responsible for knowing that certain convictions result in 
                                                                                                                
(containing 1274 at the author’s last visit).  
137. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(2012), gives the general grounds for drug deportability. Essentially, if a noncitizen after 
admission is convicted of a violation or conspiracy or attempt to violate a law related to a 
controlled substance, he is deportable. Controlled substance is defined under 21 U.S.C. § 
802(5)–(6) (2012) as “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor,” included in schedule 
I, II, III, IV, or V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. These laws essentially mean that 
possession-only offenses, including marijuana possession (under thirty grams), are considered 
deportable. See Cunnings, supra note 118, at 532.  
138. In New York, a conviction for section 221.10, “[c]riminal possession of marihuana in 
the fifth degree,” a B misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of three months in jail, N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008), makes an individual ineligible for New York City 
public housing for three years after completion of the sentence. Collateral Consequences 
Calculator—New York State, COLUM. L. SCH., http://calculator.law.columbia.edu 
[https://perma.cc/6UNX-8JQQ] (select “221.10 Criminal Possession of Marihuana in the fifth 
degree” from the menu on the left). Section 221.10 was the fifth most frequent charge at 
arraignments in New York City in 2014 with nearly 25,000 arrests in that year alone. LISA 
LINDSAY, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (Justin 
Barry ed., 2015), http://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/cc_annl_rpt_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8USP-DC98]. 
139. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1091 
(2015). 
140. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 259 (2002).  
141. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(1) (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2018). 
142. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (2012).  
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deportation.143 Because Padilla involved drug trafficking, the consequences of drug 
convictions received particular attention. The case sparked a movement among
defense offices to provide training on immigration consequences 144  but also 
highlighted the particularly severe and definite nature of the sanctions that attached 
to drug laws. As a result, the legal community has been put on notice. (There is also 
some evidence to suggest that in a post-Padilla world, defense attorneys have been 
more aware of collateral consequences generally.)145 Defense attorneys report that 
“even low-level marijuana charges [are] extremely dangerous for defendants” and so 
“defenders will try to find either noncriminal charges for their clients to plead to or 
different charges for which they may not have been originally charged.”146 Because 
the noncriminal consequences for drug cases are so profound, defendants have a 
tremendous amount to gain from negotiating around drug offenses.  
However, drug offenses are some of the trickiest charges to negotiate around and, 
therefore, may involve the use of fictional pleas. This is because the very mention of 
drugs—either in the statute itself or in the recitation of facts involved in the plea—is 
sufficient to trigger a litany of collateral consequences. For this reason, drug cases 
must be scrubbed of the fact of the drugs themselves to avoid most collateral 
consequences. This is where the fictional plea comes in.  
The Padilla case itself makes clear both the trickiness of negotiation in drug cases 
and the need for expanded negotiation offers that may indeed involve fictions. As 
Part II explained, Justice Stevens encouraged defense attorneys to bargain creatively 
to avoid deportation consequences for the client. 147 Embedded in Padilla, then, 
seems to be an acceptance that defendants may plea bargain around statutorily 
mandated collateral consequences.  
But what is a creative plea bargain that avoids deportation in a case such as Padilla?
A brief recitation of the facts is necessary to understand the difficulty posed by trying 
to achieve a “creative bargain” in the Padilla case. Jose Padilla, a self-employed 
truck-driver, veteran, and longtime legal permanent resident of the United States, had 
been driving on Interstate 65 in Kentucky when he stopped at a weigh station.148
During a search of his truck, an inspector discovered “a substantial quantity of 
marijuana.” 149  He was charged with drug trafficking under Kentucky law. Mr. 
Padilla said that he had no idea there was marijuana in the shipment, claiming instead 
that he believed he was transporting chocolate and abalone between states.150 Despite 
these claims of innocence, Mr. Padilla, on the advice of his lawyer, decided to plead 
guilty to the charge. 151  Neither he nor his lawyer realized that he would be 
mandatorily deportable. 152 Because his lawyer’s advice was wrong, the court 
                                                                                                                
143. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010). 
144. Johnson, supra note 3, at 935–40.
145. Id. at 945.  
146. Id. at 925 (footnote omitted).  
147. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373.  
148. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
149. Id.  
150. Id.  
151. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. 
152. Id.  
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overturned the conviction and remanded the case back to the original Kentucky trial 
court for decision on whether he was prejudiced by such bad advice.153  
But, what if Mr. Padilla’s attorney had instead taken Justice Stevens’s advice to 
plea bargain “creatively” to avoid deportation? What would the options have been? 
As one scholar suggested after the case was decided, there were at least two potential 
immigration-safe plea alternatives for Mr. Padilla.154 He could have taken either a 
solicitation offense or a misprision felony.155 One could imagine that both crimes, as 
felonies, would satisfy the hypothetical sympathetic prosecutor who wants to make 
sure there is some criminal penalty imposed on Mr. Padilla, while still being 
respectful of Mr. Padilla’s U.S. military service and long residence in the country. 
Indeed, it is easy to imagine that in courtrooms across the country, defendants are 
opting for pleas to solicitation rather than drug trafficking to avoid collateral 
consequences.156  
But would either plea be an accurate reflection of the facts underlying the crime? 
Solicitation is defined in Kentucky as follows: “A person is guilty of criminal 
solicitation when, with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of a 
crime, he commands or encourages another person to engage in specific conduct 
which would constitute that crime . . . .”157 Misprision is the equivalent of failing to 
report a felony. 158  Neither covers the factual allegations in the Padilla case. 159
Therefore, if Mr. Padilla had had an opportunity to plead to either crime before trial, 
he would have pleaded guilty to a crime everyone agrees he did not commit. The 
facts underlying the initial charge would have had to disappear.  
It appears then that, in a case like Padilla, the creative bargains available that also 
“reduce the likelihood of deportation” are fictional pleas. Under immigration law, 
most drug convictions make a noncitizen deportable or at least increase the likelihood 
of becoming deportable.160 As a result, a creative bargain in a drug case that reduces 
                                                                                                                
153. Id. at 387.  
154. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653–54
(2013). 
155. Id. at 2654 n.15. 
156. Some might consider Mr. Padilla’s initial decision to plead guilty to be a sort of 
fictional plea since he was accepting guilt for a crime he claims, until today, he did not commit. 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, José Padilla Speaking at University of Denver,
CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://crimmigration.com/2016/03/03/jose-padilla 
-speaking-at-university-of-denver [https://perma.cc/323M-UZZK]. In fact, statistics indicate 
that a small percent of defendants plead guilty, even when they are innocent. See Rakoff, supra
note 20 (“How prevalent is the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty? The few 
criminologists who have thus far investigated the phenomenon estimate that the overall rate 
for convicted felons as a whole is between 2 percent and 8 percent.”). 
157. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.030(1) (LexisNexis 2014).  
158. Christopher Mark Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 U.S.C. § 4: An 
Exploration of the Federal Misprision of Felon Statute, 55 ALA. L. REV. 183, 184 (2003). 
159. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1421(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (Trafficking in marijuana: 
“A person is guilty of trafficking in marijuana when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in 
marijuana.”). 
160. DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, REPRESENTING NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS:
A NATIONAL GUIDE 33 (2008), https://www.probono.net/library/attachment.132408 
[https://perma.cc/8Y23-KRJM] (noting that “Drug Trafficking” is an “aggravated felony” 
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the likelihood of deportation is generally one which does not involve a direct 
reference to narcotics. If the defendant has only drugs on him, then a defense attorney 
and prosecutor seeking a non-deportable plea will likely begin to enter the realm of 
fiction.  
The cases in the wake of Padilla demonstrate the confusion over the future of 
creative bargaining in the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context. There has been 
significant debate about how the defendant establishes prejudice where his attorney 
gave him incorrect advice. Lower courts have struggled to determine what should 
happen in the space between the rejection of the initial plea bargain offer and the 
defendant’s election to go to trial.161 In our “system of pleas,”162 the negotiation of 
the fictional plea appears to be one of the few viable options to allow defendants to 
face serious criminal penalties, while avoiding particular collateral consequences. 
The case of Lee v. United States,163 like the Padilla case, is similarly illustrative 
of the difficulties of negotiating around a drug charge without removing the drugs 
themselves from the plea bargain. In Lee, the Supreme Court decided whether the 
defendant—who was not advised that his conviction would result in deportation—
could ever demonstrate prejudice in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt.164
The Court resolved the question in favor of the petitioner, finding that he could have 
chosen to forgo a good plea deal, even in the face of terrible trial prospects.165 With 
this decision, the Court resolved a circuit split below.166  
                                                                                                                
under immigration law and that the Department of Homeland Security “may include some 
simple possession offenses, such as second or subsequent possession offenses”). 
161. In several ineffective assistance of counsel cases at the state and federal level, courts 
have referenced the attorney’s work to secure a plea that avoids collateral consequences. See, 
e.g., Parrino v. United States, 655 F. App’x 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Here, Plotnik thought 
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Parrino deserved to continue practicing as a pharmacist.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Vega,
797 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A petitioner may demonstrate that there existed a 
reasonable probability of negotiating a better plea by identifying cases indicating a willingness 
by the government to permit defendants charged with the same or a substantially similar crime 
to plead guilty to a non-removable offense.”); Song v. United States, No. CV 09-5184 DOC, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68465, at *11–12 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (“Instead, Mr. Song could 
have asked Counsel to do what the Supreme Court urged counsel to do in Padilla: ‘plea bargain 
creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the 
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers 
the removal consequence.’”); State v. Favela, 311 P.3d 1213, 1219–20 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) 
(“Thus, under this approach, a defendant could demonstrate prejudice by submitting evidence, 
for instance, that a different plea could have been negotiated that would have avoided 
automatic deportation, even if that plea would have resulted in a conviction of a crime 
requiring a longer period of incarceration.”).  
162. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
163. 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).  
164. Put another way: “Is it always irrational for a defendant facing strong evidence of 
guilt on a deportable offense to exercise his right to go to trial?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 12, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No. 16-327), 2016 WL 4920945, at *12. 
165. See Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1958. 
166. Prior to Lee, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held that strong evidence of 
2019] FICTIONAL PLEAS 887
The decision—and the arguments made by the parties during litigation of the 
case—makes clear that drug cases are ripe territory for fictional pleas. In their briefs, 
the parties argued about whether there were alternative pleas available to the 
defendant that could have avoided deportation.167 Available alternatives included, 
among others, a plea to a misdemeanor simple possession charge, a non-prosecution 
agreement, a pretrial diversion program, or a plea under the Federal First Offender 
Act.168 Those options have in common that they carry relatively low-level criminal 
penalties. For instance, the misdemeanor carries only up to a year in jail. Both a 
pretrial diversion and a non-prosecution agreement would carry no jail time. The 
Federal First Offender Act is also a diversion program.169  
Ultimately, the Court in Lee looked only to whether the defendant would have 
either accepted the plea on the table or gone to trial.170 The “plea or trial” dichotomy, 
however, ignores the range of alternative pleas that could have been negotiated to 
avoid deportation. In setting up this dichotomy, the Court also ignored Justice 
Stevens’ suggestion in Padilla that the parties should plea bargain creatively to reach 
an immigration-safe resolution.  
But what if the prosecutor did want serious criminal sanctions for the defendant 
and also an avenue to allow the defendant to remain in the country? The above 
options, all of which were suggested as alternatives by Lee’s counsel in his brief 
before the Supreme Court, would likely fall short for a prosecutor interested in 
pursuing serious criminal charges. One can imagine, however, a fictional plea that 
could result in serious sanctions and avoid deportation.  
For instance, in many training materials for defense attorneys, public defender 
offices or immigration advocates will guide attorneys on how to achieve a non-
deportable plea bargain. A handout from the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Attorneys encourages attorneys to avoid any drug-related conviction. In a 
drug case, this is, of course, an incredibly difficult task. One suggestion the handout 
makes is to “[s]pecify a substance that is not covered under 21 U.S.C. 802,” which 
designates “controlled substances” for the purposes of federal law. Or in a marijuana 
case, they encourage the defender to make sure the record reflects that the “client has 
no prior drug convictions” and that she accepts a charge of “possession for personal 
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”171 Another strategy suggested for defense 
                                                                                                                
guilt precluded a finding of prejudice under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. 
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/Live_CLE/03_Drug_Offenses_Handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5PN-X85X]. 
888 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 94:855 
attorneys in drugs cases is to plead to an “accessory after-the-fact” charge, which is 
not a deportable offense.172  
What becomes clear by looking at Padilla, Lee, and the above advice to attorneys 
representing noncitizen defendants in drug cases is that nearly every drug conviction 
dooms a defendant to deportation. A step back reveals that drug charges in general 
cover a huge range of conduct and carry many substantial collateral consequences 
not related to immigration. For that reason, to secure a “safe” plea in a drug case, the 
plea must be wiped clean of any drugs. In this context, the fictional plea serves as the 
only escape valve—barring a success at trial or a dismissal—for the defendant 
sidestepping whatever collateral consequence will be most damaging to him.  
3. Sex Offenses  
Sex offenses, like drug offenses, generally trigger automatic collateral 
consequences. In the case of sex offenses, the same consequence—sex offender 
registration—is attached to almost any conviction and affects all defendants who 
plead guilty, regardless of their background. And the consequences of sex offender 
registration are severe. 173 Sex offenders have their names and addresses posted 
publicly to inform communities about those living in their midst who have been 
convicted of a registerable offense.174 They are required to report to state authorities 
on a regular basis.175 They are also likely to be subject to housing restrictions, such 
as prohibitions on living within a certain distance of a school.176 There are tent cities 
full of individuals with sex offense records because of the massive number of 
                                                                                                                
172. DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, supra note 160, at 110. 
173. For an overview of state-by-state requirements for sex offender registration, see Jane 
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dictated by their assessed sex offender level).
176. See Jennifer Burnett, Sex Offender Residency Restriction Zones, COUNCIL ST. GOV’T
(Nov. 19, 2015, 2:42 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/sex-offender-residency 
-restriction-zones [https://perma.cc/8TGE-DS8Y] (showing that twenty-seven states 
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restrictions on where registered sex offenders can live.177 They often cannot secure 
employment.178  
Because of these consequences, avoiding sex offender registration is particularly 
critical to defendants. Some defendants would rather face significantly more jail time 
than end up on a sex offender registry.179 As one public defender in Oakland has 
written, “my clients would choose to take more jail time, more fees – anything to 
avoid being labeled a sex offender for life.”180 But sex offenses are also generally 
perceived by the public as serious crimes for which there should be significant 
punishment. Even where prosecutors may be open to negotiating around the sex 
offender requirement, there may be other constraints to such negotiation.  
The Introduction to this Article begins with a real story from criminal practice 
which demonstrates this point. Although the prosecutor understood that registration 
would lead to a serious housing crisis for the defendant, which would only exacerbate 
his precarious situation, she also wanted to make sure that the defendant faced a 
meaningful consequence for the crime. But given that almost all sex offenses were 
classified as registrable offenses by statute, the prosecutor and defense attorney 
started to experiment with fictions—how could they achieve a conviction with 
serious sanctions, but without the registration? They contemplated an assault charge, 
but it would require that they state on the record that the victim had suffered “bodily 
injury.” That suggestion was too great a “fiction” for the prosecutor.
They ultimately landed on the idea of three separate misdemeanor convictions—
a different type of fiction—since the defendant committed only a single instance of 
sex abuse. The convictions would require three instances of conduct that met the 
elements of the statute. As Section I.C.1 made clear, misdemeanors generally require 
fewer procedural hoops, including the need to state the facts supporting a plea 
bargain on the record. Although the judge could reject the plea, he or she could also 
choose to go along with it, knowing that there would be no evidence of the fiction on 
the formal record. Indeed, this is what occurred. The defendant pleaded guilty to 
three misdemeanor charges, which each carried a year in prison but no sex offender 
registration.  
There is evidence that the practice of using fictional pleas to avoid sex offender 
registration is common. In Ohio, for instance, the debate over “baseless pleas” has 
focused on the use of such pleas to help defendants circumvent registration. Ohio 
Supreme Court Justice Michael P. Donnelly, formerly a judge of the Cuyahoga 
County Common Pleas Court, has argued for a local state rule that would require a 
recitation of the facts underlying any plea that is accepted by the court. In support of 
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179. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 922 (“[O]ne public defender described an example in 
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180. Rachel Marshall, I’m a Public Defender. My Clients Would Rather Go to Jail than 
Register as Sex Offenders, VOX (July 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016 
/7/5/12059448/sex-offender-registry [https://perma.cc/B5HZ-499Y]. 
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his proposal, he cites 400 felony charges from 2008 to 2014 that were charged 
originally as sex crimes and, through the use of plea bargaining, reduced to non-sex-
crime offenses.181 He noted that the most common reduced charges were abduction, 
felonious assault, or child endangerment.182 Interestingly, all of these are serious 
crimes with the potential for hefty sentences,183 but they do not require sex offender 
registration. One can imagine that these charges would provide a space for an 
agreement that satisfied the needs of the prosecutor—to hold the defendant 
accountable—and the needs of the defendant—to avoid sex offender registration. But 
such a meeting of the minds might also require, as the critics of this practice note, a 
resort to fiction.  
II. FICTIONAL PLEAS: A CASE STUDY IN THE DECLINE OF TRUTH 
Thus far, this Article has given an overview of the practice of fictional plea 
bargaining: Who uses such bargains and to what end? In which types of cases will 
fictional pleas be used to greatest effect? In this description, one sees the many 
benefits of the fictional plea to practitioners on the ground. These benefits are felt 
immediately in individual cases. A defendant may avoid being ripped from his family 
and the country he calls home. A prosecutor may get to use her discretion to make 
sure that a defendant gets help for substance abuse but does not end up on a lifetime 
sex offender registry, which will ultimately, in her view, harm the defendant and 
society more than keeping him off the list and seeking alternative forms of 
punishment. Or, a judge takes a stand, albeit quietly, against the federal government’s
immigration priorities. The fictional plea, in many cases, serves a clear purpose and 
is the result of the good intentions of the actors involved.  
There are, of course, questions about the ethical lines crossed by lawyers and 
judges when they participate (knowingly) in these fictions. The Rules of Professional 
Responsibility require a duty of candor for lawyers before the tribunal.184 There are 
clear arguments that when lawyers enter a plea bargain on the record based on 
fictions, they are in conflict with these rules. 185  But, as many scholars have 
                                                                                                                
181. See supra note 81. 
182. Dissell, supra note 81. 
183. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(D)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp. 
2018) (stating that felonious assault is either a first or second degree felony, depending on the 
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conduct); id. § 2929.14(A)(1)–(5) (defining the definite prison sentence ranges for felony 
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184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer 
shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false 
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”); id. r. 3.4(b) 
(“[A] lawyer shall not falsify evidence [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely.”).  
185. Mari Byrne has argued specifically about why fictional pleas violate the ethical rules 
that bind lawyers. Byrne, supra note 14, at 2966–67. But other scholars have persuasively 
argued that lawyers should have a deeper commitment to truth than what a formalist reading 
of the ethical rules requires. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and 
Subjective Perspectives on Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105, 111, 148 
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persuasively argued, lawyers are not bound by a duty to total truth.186 Judges have 
their own set of ethical rules, which also require them to act in accordance with the 
law and promote confidence in the judiciary.187
Leaving aside debates about judicial and attorney ethics, this Article instead 
focuses on how fictional pleas serve as a case study in criminal justice problem 
solving and how little truth matters to the current problem-solving scheme. What 
does it mean that all parties in the criminal justice system agree to allow a lie to 
become fact? What does the fictional plea tell us about the role of truth in our modern 
adversarial structure? Faced with the moral quandary of mandatory collateral 
consequences, the system adjusts by discarding truth and focuses solely on resolution. 
The fictional plea lays bare the soul of an institution where everything has become a 
bargaining chip: not merely collateral consequences, but truth itself. Rather than a 
grounding principle, truth is nothing more than another factor to negotiate around.  
A. Truth Seeking vs. Problem-Solving 
At the outset, it is important to make three things clear, each of which will be 
developed more below. The first is that this Article presupposes that truth is a 
normative goal of the adversarial model of criminal justice. The second is that this 
Article does not purport to define truth, but nor does it abandon the premise that some 
version of the truth is knowable. The third is that discarding fictional pleas will not 
solve any particular problem with the criminal justice system; it will not restore truth 
to some mythical rightful place. For this reason, the critique offered here is meant to 
serve as a case study in the role of truth in the system, not as a prescription to remedy 
an ill.  
Truth is not, of course, an easily defined concept. There is a rich literature about 
the nature of truth in the adversarial system, which demonstrates the depth of the 
inquiry.188 Even given these debates about truth, this Article rejects the notion that 
                                                                                                                
(2016) (“The ability of a judge, or a legal system, to face social conflict in an honest way 
depends on the facts of the dispute being presented to decision-makers in a fundamentally 
honest way. That does not mean lawyers should aim directly at the truth, but it does mean 
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prohibiting the use of false evidence).”). 
186. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T,
CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH (2001); W. BRADLEY WENDEL,
ETHICS AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 121–25 (2014) (ebook) (discussing scholarship by 
Deborah Rhode and William Simon that have used as an example a lawyer advising a client 
to tell a small lie in order to keep her public benefits; the permissibility of this advice lies in 
the unfairness of the public benefits scheme itself); Albert W. Alshuler, Lawyers and Truth-
Telling, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (2003) (discussing debates among scholars about the 
obligations for attorneys to be honest); David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity 
(When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815 (2005) (arguing that lawyers 
should serve as an instrument to share their clients’ stories, even where those stories may 
involve deception). 
187. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
188. For just a small sample, see Alshuler, supra note 186 (discussing the scholarly 
responses to the adversarial system’s relationship to truth telling); Stephanos Bibas, Designing 
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truth is undefinable.189 Facts tell us the truth or at least something approximating it 
in any particular case.190 For our purposes, it is enough to say that the discovery of 
truth (or something close to it) is possible in many criminal cases via the collection 
of facts.  
Nor is truth synonymous with justice, but it is not surprising that they are often 
paired together as twin concepts “since establishing the truth is . . . a precursor to 
determining just[ice].”191 But fictional pleas exist because justice does not always 
require truth or, rather, actors within the criminal system perceive that they can 
achieve justice without truth. And yet, truth is certainly one of the purported goals of 
the adversarial system. Wigmore’s famous line that cross-examination, the heart of 
the adversarial model, is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth”192 has been repeated so often that most lawyers accept it 
as gospel. The American model of criminal adjudication—including plea 
bargaining—has been imported around the globe on the strength of the argument that 
it is more transparent and fair than the systems previously in place in many countries 
and that this, in turn, leads to more truthful outcomes.193  
Furthermore, although the criminal justice system has always had a tolerance for 
legal fictions,194 the fact that the federal system and most states require some factual 
basis for a plea bargain indicates a normative commitment to recording some version 
of truth.195 For instance, in his dissent in Libretti v. United States, Justice Stevens 
                                                                                                                
Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without Trials as Backstops,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2016) (discussing the challenges to accuracy in the adversarial 
system); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (1975) (“My theme . . . is that our adversary system rates truth too low among the 
values that institutions of justice are meant to serve” and that lawyers have a responsibility for 
truth telling.); Kenneth S. Klein, Truth and Legitimacy (in Courts), 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1
(2016) (comparing the meaning of truth within the legal system to the public perception of the 
role of truth in courts). 
189. See Wendel, supra note 185.
190. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1220 (2004) 
(pushing back against the concept of evidence law as being primarily about truth seeking, but 
noting that “[m]ost analyses of evidence law take litigation’s prime object to be the discovery 
of truth about past events”). 
191. Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The 
Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 
ALB. L. REV. 1095, 1095, 1108–11 (2013) (discussing the ways in which truth and justice are 
not necessarily synonymous in studies about the popular legitimacy of the court system). 
192. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 
ed. 1974). 
193. See, e.g., Thea Johnson, Latin Justice: A New Look, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 2013, at 
57–64 (discussing the transition in Latin American countries from an inquisitorial to an 
adversarial model of justice that is based on the American system). 
194. See infra text accompanying notes 226–27.
195. This normative value is also repeated and embraced by scholars. See, e.g., Bibas, 
supra note 188, at 1061 (“The core goals of criminal procedural system should be accuracy 
and fairness. The investigatory, bargaining, and advising processes should be (re)designed to 
ensure the factual, legal, and moral accuracy of the resulting convictions, sentences, and 
collateral consequences.”). 
2019] FICTIONAL PLEAS 893
made clear that Rule 11 is the procedural vehicle by which judges determine the truth 
of the matter, which is required for enforcing the substantive law.196 As Justice 
Stevens wrote, a court must “satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for any 
judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea . . . . Were a court to do otherwise, it would 
permit the parties to define the limits of its power.”197 In the same decision, Justice 
Stevens rejects the idea that a wealthy defendant may be able to “forfeit” property 
that the government has no statutory right to simply to gain a “favorable sentence.”198
It is truth that, in theory, prevents that scenario from playing out.  
It is interesting, then, that it was Justice Stevens who embraced the problem-
solving tool of creative bargaining in the Padilla case fifteen years later. Although 
the creative bargain in Padilla implicates different concerns than that in Libretti, as 
Section I.C.2 makes clear, there was simply no truth-based plea that would have 
allowed Mr. Padilla to escape deportation and be punished for drug running in the 
criminal justice system. In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has caught up 
somewhat to the reality of the criminal system. As Justice Kennedy noted in Missouri 
v. Frye, after a lengthy discussion of the pervasiveness of plea bargaining, “To note 
the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it.”199 Padilla, Frye, and Frye’s 
companion case, Lafler v. Cooper,200 all acknowledge that plea bargaining as a
problem-solving tool is critical to the functioning of the modern adversarial system.  
But the current system of plea bargaining has become separated from the 
purported principles of adversarialism.201 Rather than truth seeking, the system is 
obsessively focused on efficiency. 202  Indeed, the modern adversarial model has 
allowed efficient problem solving to subsume the broader normative goals of the 
system. As Christopher Slobogin argues, plea bargaining itself is incompatible with 
the purported premises of the adversarial system, including procedure based on open 
confrontation.203 Such confrontation has traditionally been viewed as a means for 
discovering truth. The wholesale embrace of plea bargaining, then, goes along with 
an abandonment of some of the fundamental values that undergird the criminal 
system, including truth seeking. Without an anchor of truth, the only guiding 
principle is efficiency—getting the case resolved quickly and (ideally) with some 
gains for both sides. 
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The efficient plea bargaining trade-offs tend to be well-known.204 The prosecutor 
agrees to relative leniency in sentencing or charging for a promise from the defendant 
that he will plead guilty and save the prosecutor’s office resources. But as Section 
I.B outlines, these trade-offs may include much outside the sentence and charge.205
This makes sense if the system is structured to purely resolve cases rather than seek 
truth. As Ken Strutin has noted, “Pretrial innocence and guilt are legal commodities, 
situational legal truths.”206 They become—along with the charge, the sentence, the 
potential collateral consequences, and, even, the truth—bargaining chips to be traded 
in search of a solution.207
And despite the fact that factual basis requirements indicate a normative 
commitment to truth, as a practical matter they tend not to stop fictional pleas from 
entering the formal record. Because the agreements of the parties are generally 
accepted by rote, “the findings of fact that emerge from plea bargaining are not 
subject to any meaningful testing.”208 Even where the judge requests a factual basis, 
“this requirement can be satisfied merely by asking the parties in charge of evidence 
production—the prosecutor and the defense attorney—if such a basis exists.”209 As 
a result, a lie—particularly a well-intentioned lie—becomes easier to present to the 
court.  
It may be appropriate, then, to characterize fictional pleas as, what Julia Simon-
Kerr has termed, “systemic lying,” in which multiple actors in the criminal system 
allow a lie to continue.210 Such lying may occur where stakeholders perceive that the 
lie is warranted or excused in the face of some other, greater, cause. Simon-Kerr 
explores a number of examples of the phenomena, including the “testilying” of police 
officers on the witness stand,211 the use of “pious perjury” in the early nineteenth 
century to avoid capital punishment for minor crimes, and the tendency of juries to 
nullify in trials in the post-Reconstruction South.212  
But as Simon-Kerr points out, resolving such conflict through lying poses grave 
risks to the rule of law: “[I]t is not a positive condition for the legal system such that 
we should welcome it when it appears and rationalize it as an efficient de facto 
                                                                                                                
204. Thea Johnson, Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 
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to avoid capital punishment for minor crimes and the tendency of juries to nullify in trials in 
the post-Reconstruction South); Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution,
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solution to certain moral-formal dilemmas.”213 Fictional pleas have become a “de 
facto solution” for a group of criminal justice actors confronted with vulnerable 
defendants facing serious collateral consequences.  
But the reason that the fictional plea emerges as a solution to such a problem is 
that the modern system of plea bargaining values problem solving over truth seeking. 
These well-meaning actors, when confronted by what they perceive as the injustices 
of mandatory collateral consequences have, largely, not sought to lobby federal and 
state legislatures to undo the law but have rather added collateral consequences to 
the pot of chips to be bargained for during plea negotiations. This response is possible 
because truth is not a guidepost for the resolution of criminal cases.  
1. Fictions as a Prosecutorial Tool  
The descriptive portion of this Article paints a portrait of a “new” district attorney, 
committed in certain cases—particularly cases that implicate immigration issues—
to helping defendants avoid severe collateral consequences, while still holding those 
same defendants accountable within the criminal system. This appears to be an 
empathetic vision of prosecutorial discretion, and again, in any individual case it very 
well may be a form of compassionate prosecution.  
But if everything is a bargaining chip, the party that benefits is the one with the 
most power to negotiate. In the criminal system, that is the prosecutor. As a systemic 
issue, fictional pleas function as an additional tool that increases the power of the 
prosecutors and may be readily used to further punish defendants. Both courts and 
scholars alike have written about the coercive nature of plea bargaining as a practice 
(separate and apart from fictional pleas).214 Despite evidence that judges are taking a 
more active role in plea bargaining,215 the modern adversarial criminal process is run 
by the parties, particularly by prosecutors.216 Collateral consequences, although of a 
different variety, have now become additional bargaining chips. Although they can 
be used to lessen the criminal penalty, they can also be a powerful strategic tool for 
prosecutors to use against defendants.217
Progressive prosecutors who want to protest the mandatory imposition of serious 
collateral consequences have other options beyond the fictional plea. In examining 
these roads not taken, one sees again that the fictional plea––as a systemic matter––
does not serve the interests of defendants in the long run, even if in any individual 
case there are defendants who benefit substantially from its use. One alternative 
option for prosecutors is to decline to charge cases in which they believe the 
imposition of collateral consequences would work against the interests of justice. It 
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is well within the discretion of prosecutors to decline prosecution.218 And such an 
action would serve as an expressive use of their discretion: an open rejection of the 
legislative decisions of both the state and federal governments219 to impose collateral 
consequences in the first place. A prosecutor might respond to this alternative by 
noting that dismissing the charges serves only to benefit the defendant and eliminates 
the other side of the bargain––that the prosecutor gets to hold the defendant 
accountable. But such a defense is grounded in the idea that justice in the criminal 
system is manifested not by taking a stand against injustice but by negotiating around 
the perceived injustice.220  
Prosecutors could also join lobbying efforts to reform the system of collateral 
consequences. Prosecutors’ offices frequently lobby on criminal justice issues.221
Prosecutor associations take formal positions on matters ranging from discovery laws 
to gun laws to reforms to the jury system.222 In Ohio, prosecutors lobbied against the 
adoption of a rule that would require the parties to enter a factual basis for the plea 
on the record.223 These positions can and often are adopted by the legislative bodies 
charged with making decisions on criminal justice reform issues. A collective call 
from prosecutors to do away with the imposition of mandatory collateral 
consequences would very likely make some headway. And yet, such a call has been 
absent––even as prosecutors have publicly decried the results of mandatory collateral 
consequences. There simply is not an institutional force to push prosecutors in this 
direction.224 The system, rather, has settled into a particular routine to resolve issues 
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of perceived injustice and this routine embraces the “systemic lying” identified by 
Simon-Kerr over a more formalized fight against the injustice itself.  
B. Present Fictions as Future Truth  
One of the most concerning features of the fictional plea is that it creates a record 
that then becomes “truth.” Fictional pleas are not legal fictions, a commonly used 
device in the legal system.225 The legal system has always tolerated and endorsed 
legal fictions. They serve as “an enabler,” allowing the “application of the law to 
novel legal questions and circumstances.” 226 Formal legal fictions require “a 
suspension of belief because [they are] not meant to deceive”227 but rather assist. 
When we say that a corporation is a person, we know that a corporation does not 
breath air, but we accept such a fiction for the limited purposes of establishing the 
rights and responsibilities of the corporation.228 In criminal law, there are a number 
of fictions that sustain the system. For instance, guilty defendants, who fully intend 
to plead guilty, enter formal pleas of “not guilty” to keep the case moving forward.229
But fictional pleas are “meant to deceive.” Unlike legal fictions, which are 
understood to be fictions not just by the parties to the individual transaction but also 
by anyone who views them from the outside, a fictional plea, even when done with 
a wink and a nod among the parties, results, as with all pleas, in a record of criminal 
conviction. After the defendant accepts a guilty plea––whether fictional or not––he 
carries with him a conviction which has real-world outcomes.230 The conviction 
follows him. It may, for instance, prevent him from voting.231 That consequence 
occurs because the conviction stands as proof that the defendant committed a crime 
and accepted guilt for that crime.232 Even if the parties knew about the fiction, no one 
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else does. The public, federal immigration authorities, or local state agencies that 
impose penalties on individuals convicted of certain crimes are all in the dark about 
the facts underlying the conviction. It does not make sense, then, to think of fictional 
pleas as legal fictions, either by operation or result.233  
A fictional plea becomes a permanent record of a conviction. But there is no mark 
on an individual’s criminal record to indicate that a particular plea represented the 
facts or did not. The plea formally represents a confession to a charge, which is 
translated to a conviction and then to a criminal record.234 And in this sense, the 
fiction is transformed into truth. A fictional plea tells a false narrative about what 
crime the defendant committed and for which he accepted guilt. The fictional plea 
therefore does not simply enable the “application of the law to novel circumstances,”
but produces a record which is used in all future cases involving this particular 
defendant. The “downstream actors”235—whether a future judge, district attorney, or 
probation officer, reviewing the rap sheet of a defendant—will not ask themselves if 
the conviction was or was not the result of a particular type of bargain, but will accept 
the conviction as fact.  
At the moment the plea bargain is entered, this may not seem problematic, but on 
both an individual level and systemic level, it is a cause for concern. On the 
individual level, the defendant is creating a record of behavior that is not accurate. 
Returning to the example from the Introduction, the defendant is admitting to three 
acts of sex abuse, rather than one. Although the three acts are categorized as 
misdemeanors and therefore less “serious” crimes, to the outside world they indicate
a pattern of abusive behavior, where one may not actually exist. It is not hard to 
imagine a future prosecutor in a potential future criminal case pointing to the 
defendant’s criminal record and harping on the defendant’s repeat crimes. Similarly, 
the defendant who claims he inhaled toxic vapors rather than smoked marijuana has 
created a record of what may be seen as potentially “worse” behavior than what he 
was actually charged with. Marijuana is now legal across many states, which is a 
good indication that the social approbation associated with use of the drug has 
weakened. Not so with “huffing,” which is essentially what the defendant pleaded to. 
                                                                                                                
1415 (2016).  
233. Some scholars have argued that the traditional line between acceptable and 
nonacceptable legal fictions appears to lie at “the ultimate question of culpability,” meaning 
that traditionally, the system objects to an innocent man pleading guilty to a crime he did not 
commit, but not necessarily to a guilty man pleading to a crime he did not commit, rather than 
the crime he did commit. Culpability differentiates the two men. See Bowers, supra note 17, 
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234. As Brandon Garrett notes, we should not think of plea bargains as confessions because, 
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used for determining collateral consequences. Garrett, supra note 232, at 1437–38.  
235. See Michael P. Donnelly, End Factually Baseless Plea Bargains, 42 LITIG., no. 3, 
2016, at 6. 
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The immediate benefits in each case were clear and important, but in both cases the 
plea has created a record of behavior that may have unintended consequences down 
the road.  
There are other ways the defendant may be hurt by his false record. As Eisha Jain 
notes, once an individual is “marked” with a criminal conviction, criminal justice 
agencies and even organizations outside of the criminal system use the “mark” to 
make a number of determinations about the individual.236 For instance, probation 
reports at both the state and federal level are often based on the defendant’s criminal 
record. These reports generate recommendations about sentencing and rehabilitation. 
In federal courts, each additional crime on the defendant’s record has the potential to 
generate points, which drive up his sentencing guidelines range. Of course, the 
defendant was already facing a criminal charge, even before the fictional plea, but 
fictional pleas (and other forms of creative bargaining) often result in the defendant 
accepting a more serious charge.237 That more serious charge may avoid certain 
consequences at the moment but can easily lead to additional consequences down the 
road.  
There are also less obvious examples of the negative consequences of fictional 
pleas. For instance, impeachment by prior criminal conviction is a common tactic 
that lawyers use during trials. Such impeachment impacts the decisions of defendants 
and other witnesses to take the stand and, in turn, weakens the voice of those with 
criminal records, even where the record may not reflect truth.238 Again, there is no 
way to explain the nature of the plea after the fact.239 As a result, a plea to a more 
serious charge or a charge that simply does not reflect the individual’s conduct may 
discourage that individual from testifying in his own defense or acting as a witness 
in future cases. False narratives about prior cases have a way of weaving themselves 
into the narrative of future cases through these evidence rules. 
Beyond the individual level, fictional pleas can have a systemic impact on the 
criminal justice system. We are in a moment where scholars, practitioners, and 
politicians are focused on data collection as a way of studying the criminal system.240
Fictional pleas skew the data, telling false stories not only about individual 
defendants but about patterns and trends more generally. The study of these trends 
has an impact on a range of issues, including funding for criminal justice initiatives 
or institutions. Fictional pleas may give accurate information about what sorts of 
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cases are disposed of in criminal court, but they slant the data about what sorts of 
crimes are being committed and by whom. Indeed, in reviewing cases from Ohio that 
had entered the criminal justice system as registrable sex offenses but exited the 
system as non-registrable, non-sex offenses, one sees the ways in which the fictional 
plea masks the number and types of sex crimes occurring within a jurisdiction.241
(Although true statistics may be masked anyway by other factors, such as policing 
trends in the jurisdiction.)
The fictional plea solves an immediate need for the defendant that justifies the use 
of the underlying fiction to the parties. But these fictions become future truths that 
shape the individual defendant’s experience going forward and also the way the 
system responds to defendants, individually and collectively.  
CONCLUSION
This study of fictional pleas should force us to examine our system of collateral 
consequences and the nature of the criminal system more broadly. Fictional pleas 
demonstrate both the distorting impact that mandatory collateral consequences have 
on the criminal system, but also the slipperiness of the criminal system itself, which 
although seemingly bound by formal rules and procedures, finds a way to solve 
problems that are well outside those boundaries. By putting in place so many serious 
consequences that must be imposed even for relatively low-level criminal behavior, 
legislatures have created a web of overlapping concerns for criminal defendants. To 
untangle them from the web, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are willing 
to engage in “systemic lying.” 
Fictional pleas expose the extreme lengths that stakeholders are willing to go to 
respond to the expanding scope of noncriminal sanctions that are implicated by the 
criminal system. We have a system that involves judges, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys conspiring to assist defendants in avoiding the terrible fates that have been 
imposed upon them by legislatures. It should give lawmakers pause that their 
collateral consequences policies have created this morass within the criminal system.  
But it should give the actors within the system pause as well that their proposed 
solution to this problem has not been to lobby for change, refuse to move forward on 
cases where injustice would manifest, or otherwise protest against the mandatory 
imposition of collateral consequences. Rather, the solution has been plea bargaining. 
Such an obsessive focus on “getting to plea bargain”242 has profound consequences 
for the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.  
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